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ABSTRACT
The early 21st century will be remembered for its shift in global
economic power dynamics. Within three decades, China has
fostered the growth of globally prominent firms and its capital
market advanced as the world’s second most meaningful market.
Chinese firms—many of which are subject to an illiberal, political
governance—are increasingly integrated with the world economy,
attracting domestic and global public investors. Neither state
ownership and control, political influence, nor weakly functioning
legal institutions stand in the way of these firms’ access to capital.
This reality challenges law and development theories and notions of
corporate governance best practices.
This Article discusses the puzzling allure of Chinese public firms
to external suppliers of capital, while illuminating the functions of
illiberal governance in Chinese firms through both the state’s and
Communist Party’s capacities. The Article shows how alongside its
many obstructions, China’s illiberal governance system plays an
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important role in promoting market regularity, providing investors
with the assurances necessary to secure the flow of external finance.
Implications for global investors and policymakers outside China
are assessed against the backdrop of recent developments in U.S.China relations.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, China’s presence in the world
economy has increased dramatically. This Article focuses on
China’s rising global financial integration and particularly, on the
growing access of Chinese firms to foreign capital through public
finance.1
China’s capital market is now the second largest capital market
in the world, with institutional investors from across the globe
queuing up for investment licenses. Chinese companies have long
been able to access foreign capital beyond their geographical
borders as well. Hundreds of Chinese companies are listed for trade
on U.S. stock exchanges, and over a thousand more trade on other
prominent global stock exchanges.2
This growing availability of external capital challenges many
fundamental assumptions underlying modern law and
development theories and notions of corporate governance best
practices. Scholars have long understood private ownership and
liberal corporate governance as engines for growth and global
expansion. Yet many large Chinese firms with global presence
feature forms of state control, and almost all globally prominent
Chinese firms—whether they are private or state-controlled—are
potentially subject to the political clout of the Chinese Communist
Party. The orthodox approach also holds robust legal institutions as
a necessary precondition for external finance. Yet China’s capital
markets continue to expand and attract new firms and investors
without the qualities of a well-functioning legal system. Chinese
public firms are thus able to raise capital in the absence of many of
the attributes assumed necessary under widespread notions of
corporate capitalism.
What can explain this puzzle? To date, scholars have failed to
reconcile the rise of Chinese firms and their appeal to investors with
conventional assumptions. 3 This Article contributes to this
discussion. Perhaps surprisingly, it finds answers to the puzzling
allure of Chinese public firms in the functions of China’s illiberal
corporate governance system.

1
Public finance is capital raised from public investors through the capital
market.
2 See infra Part II.b.
3 See infra Part II.c.
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Side by side with the embrace of conventional corporate
governance mechanisms, a parallel and much stronger governance
system operates in China. Through both state and Communist Party
capacities, this system employs carrots and sticks that ensure market
regularity and support the growth of Chinese public firms and
China’s economy more generally.
Alongside its many obstructions, therefore, China’s illiberal
corporate governance system plays an important role in providing
investors with the assurances necessary to secure the flow of
external finance.
This Article makes several contributions. First, in showing how
illiberal, even political, governance affects the availability of external
finance and supports the rise of public firms, the Article challenges
conventional understanding about the disruptive effects of state
ownership and politicized control.
Second, the Article contributes to an important and timely
foreign policy debate. Recent shifts in global economic power
dynamics and the rising calls for an economic decoupling from
China have led policymakers worldwide to reassess the implications
of China’s economic ascent on their own domestic markets. Given
the continuous appeal of Chinese firms to global investors, the role
of illiberal governance in these firms and its impact on investors and
the global financial system should be better understood and
considered as part of policy debates.
The Article unfolds as follows: Part II contextualizes the puzzle.
It contrasts the striking expansion of China’s capital market and the
global rise of its public firms with conventional understandings of
development and growth. Part III provides a brief background of
China’s conventional corporate governance system and explains the
heightened potential for investors’ abuse. Part IV reveals the
operation of a parallel, alternative, and illiberal governance system.
It shows how state and Party capacities employ carrots and sticks
that promote market regularity and mitigate investment risks. Part
V discusses considerations for institutional investors and U.S.
policymakers in the context of the current pitfalls in U.S.-China
relations. Part VI concludes.
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THE PUZZLING RISE OF CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS AND THEIR
RISING INTEGRATION WITH GLOBAL FINANCIAL
MARKETS4

Some aspects of China’s rapid economic ascend are more known
than others. China’s leading spot in the desired Fortune Global 500
list, for example, had carried recent headlines.5 The prominence of
state ownership and political influence among these firms, and in
the Chinese market at large, has been at the focus of attention.6 Yet
China’s place in the Fortune Global 500 list, impressive as it be does
not say much about how Chinese firms are financed, nor to what
extent they are integrated with global financial markets and into the
global economy more generally.
More revealing of these aspects, yet less often discussed, is the
ability of Chinese firms to raise capital from public investors,
whether domestically or outside China. Having access to public
finance is considered an important step in financial market
development and has become particularly important in China,
especially in sectors and industries where state support is funneled

4
This Article focuses on equity capital raised from public investors as an
aspect of China’s increasing integration with financial markets. Other forms of
public finance are outside the scope.
5
In 2020, China topped the list with the largest number of firms (124 including
mainland China and Hong Kong, excluding Taiwan), exceeding Western
leadership of the list for the first time in history. Alan Murray & David Meyer, The
Fortune Global 500 is Now More Chinese than American, FORTUNE (Aug. 10, 2020,)
https://fortune.com/2020/08/10/fortune-global-500-china-rise-ceodaily/[https://perma.cc/HA66-KSVN]. Note, however, Chinese firms still lag
behind U.S. firms in terms of total revenue. See Visualize the Global 500, FORTUNE,
https://fortune.com/global500/2019/visualizations
[https://perma.cc/UC3E2TBZ].
6
Close to seventy-five percent of the Chinese firms on this list are formally
owned by the Chinese government (forty-eight firms are owned by the central
government, thirty-two by the local level of SASAC, and twelve firms are owned
by state-owned financial institutions). See Interpretation of the 2020 Fortune Global
500 List of State-Owned Enterprises, Report by the State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission of the State Council, Aug. 11, 2020,
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877938/n2879597/n2879599/c15347659/c
ontent.html [https://perma.cc/T2EW-EUFP]. Many other firms in the list are
subject to the political clout of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) even without
any state-ownership. Haier Group, Huawei, and even Alibaba and Tencent are
among the Fortune Global 500 firms that are arguably considered to have ties with
the Party-state. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond
Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015) (exploring
the extent to which the state in China exerts control over large Chinese companies).
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to preferred firms. 7 Chinese firms can now raise public finance
through China’s domestic capital market as well as expand their
financing efforts through offshore financial markets.
Better integration with global financial markets gives firms
access to a broader base of public-financed capital. Access to a
broader base of capital impacts the growth potential of individual
firms and the economy in which they trade and operate.
a. China’s Capital Market Growth and Foreign Investments8
Over the last decade, China’s capital market has seen largely
constant and significant growth, as measured by the number of
firms listed and by total market capitalization. At the end of 2005,
mainland China stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)—had 1,377 public
companies with a market capitalization of 401.8 billion USD. In
2010, the number of listed firms reached 2,063 with a total market
capitalization of 4.028 trillion USD. By the end of 2019, China’s
capital market reached a striking 3,777 firms listed, with a total
market capitalization of 8.5 trillion USD.9
The growth of China’s capital market is telling in relative terms
as well. In less than three decades, China’s capital market grew to
be the second largest capital market in the world, 10 outgrowing
7
State-backed debt is still a meaningful source of financing even for China’s
listed firms but is extended mainly to state-controlled enterprises. Estimates
suggest a median debt ratio of fifty percent among non-financial Chinese listed
firms. See Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern
Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190, 203 (2015).
8
Unless stated otherwise, I use the term “capital market” in reference to equity
capital (and specifically “A shares,” see infra note 20) on both mainland stock
exchanges. Most of the data in this section predates COVID-19. The long-term
implications of the pandemic are yet to be observed.
9
Data drawn from the World Bank, infra note 10.
10 See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$) – China,
United
States,
Japan,
Germany,
United
Kingdom,
WORLD
BANK
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=CN-US-JPDE-GB [https://perma.cc/GLR4-NTYM] (comparing total market capitalization of
listed domestic companies in China with the United States, Japan, United Kingdom,
and Germany); cf. Listed Domestic Companies, Total – China, United States, Japan,
Germany,
United
Kingdom,
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=CN-USJP-DE-GB [https://perma.cc/GZ6J-GJYP] (comparing total number of listed
domestic companies in the same countries).
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veteran competing markets and representing 10.1 percent of global
stock market capitalization.11
Notwithstanding the preference by some Chinese firms to list
offshore (mainly high-growth tech companies), the number of IPOs
(Initial Public Offering) in China continues to rise, 12 reaching 429
IPOs in 2017, thirty-six percent of global IPOs.13 This is while the
capital markets of other countries have been shrinking,14 and despite

11
Global market capitalization is the market value of all outstanding shares
of all publicly traded companies. China’s total market capitalization is second only
to the United States’, whose market capitalization represents thirty-six percent of
the global market capitalization. Kim Iskyan, China’s Stock Markets Have Soared by
1,479%
Since
2003,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Nov.
6,
2016,
7:00
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/world-stock-market-capitalizations-2016-11
[https://perma.cc/SFW5-QX4J]; Which Countries Control the Global Stock Market?,
BESPOKE (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-bigblog/which-countries-control-the-global-stock-market/[https://perma.cc/56BUBCAR] (basing its analysis on data compiled by Bloomberg).
12
A further boost is expected due to China’s new technology boards. See, e.g.,
Xie Yu, IPO Frenzy Grips China’s Nasdaq-Style STAR Market, WALL ST. J. (July 16,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-frenzy-grips-chinas-nasdaq-style-starmarket-11594893290 [https://perma.cc/47DY-YS48].
13
There was a sharp decline in 2018 and a rise thereafter with 197 IPOs in
2019.
See
Global
IPO
Trends:
Q4
2017,
EY
15-18,
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/eycom/en_gl/topics/assurance/assurance-pdfs/ey-global-ipo-trends-q4-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RMQ-2Q4M]; cf. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2019, EY 16-19,
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/growth/eyglobal-ipo-trends-q4-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RNS-Y9UR].
Note, these
numbers represent mainland China only, excluding IPOs of “Chinese firms” in
Hong Kong. The IPOs of Chinese firms comprise a substantial number of the Hong
Kong IPO market. See infra note 33. After including IPO numbers in Hong Kong,
greater China markets had 394 IPOs in 2020 thus far (Q3), forty-five percent of
global IPOs. See Evelyn Cheng, Chinese Companies Are Leading the IPO Rush Amid a
‘Flight
from
Uncertainty,’
CNBC
(Oct.
27,
2020,
12:18
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/27/chinese-companies-are-leading-the-globalipo-rush-amid-a-flight-from-uncertainty.html [https://perma.cc/WBZ3-MK2K].
14
OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019, OECD 18-21 (2019),
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWM6-D49X].
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China’s known stringent IPO approval system,15 and the relatively
high cost of capital for Chinese issuers.16
Extreme levels of oversubscription to Chinese domestic IPOs
reflect high demand on part of public investors. 17 The rising
demand by foreign investors is particularly striking.18
Foreign investment in China’s capital market is still restricted
and is facilitated mainly through China’s Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investors scheme (QFIIs). 19 Under this scheme,
selected foreign institutional investors receive a license from China’s
15
China’s current IPO system is gradually being replaced by a registrationbased system which relies on disclosure by companies and supervision on part of
stock exchanges rather than on a stringent government review and approval
process. IPOs in the SSE and SZSE technology boards have already moved to a
registration-based system. The shift was recently acknowledged in the amendment
to the PRC Securities law: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [中华人
民共和国证券法] (Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China) (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005,
amended Dec. 28, 2019, effective, March 1, 2020), art. 9, 12, 29, [hereinafter PRC
Securities
Law]
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=31925&lib=law&EncodingNam
e=big5 [https://perma.cc/9JV7-ZEHN].
16
See Yiming Qian, Jay R. Ritter & Xinjian Shao, Initial Public Offerings Chinese
Style
(Jan.
13,
2021)
(working
paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3682089
[https://perma.cc/52D7-K4KL].
17
A simple Google search for the terms “China,” “IPO,” and
“Oversubscription” produced thousands of media results reporting
oversubscriptions in the IPO of individual firms. See, e.g., Hudson Lockett, Chinese
Water Brand’s IPO More than 1,000 Times Subscribed, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/cd431c24-e79c-40b7-af72-5a4ce559b7d2
[https://perma.cc/27MY-HSRU]; China’s First IPO Under New Rules More than
4,000
Times
Oversubscribed,
REUTERS
(Jan.
25,
2016),
https://fr.reuters.com/article/china-ipo-subscription-idUSL3N1591S9
[https://perma.cc/NNG2-65E6]. But see Qian et al., supra note 16 (noting the role
of price restrictions in artificially boosting demand).
18
See Karen Yeung, Old RQFII Still Popular Despite New China Investment
Channels,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (July
7,
2017,
4:08
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2101695/old-rqfiistill-popular-despite-new-china-investment [https://perma.cc/K2G5-XJF3].
19
A license-based foreign investment regime has been used since 2002. The
qualification requirements and the assigned quotas were revised from time to time.
A separate program was approved in 2011 to facilitate the use of Renminbi held
outside mainland China for investments in the domestic market—Renminbi
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. The QFII and RQFII schemes have been
recently unified, and the quota regime was abolished in early 2020. PBOC & SAFE
Remove QFII / RQFII Investment Quotas and Promote Further Opening-up of China’s
Financial
Market,
SAFE
NEWS
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2020/0507/1677.html
[https://perma.cc/3CQ8DS5G]. For ease of reference, I refer to these programs together as QFII.
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securities market regulator (China Securities Regulatory
Commission, or CSRC) to invest in the common outstanding shares
of Chinese firms that trade domestically in Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges (“A shares”).20
More than 400 foreign institutions from thirty-one countries
have invested through this scheme since its initiation in 2002.21 Fifty
of the currently licensed QFIIs (313 total) are American institutions.22
This path was, until recently, subject to regimented investment
quotas. The recent removal of the QFII quota regime is expected to
boost direct foreign investments into the Chinese capital market
even further, 23 and to support China’s further integration with
global financial markets.
Additionally, China has developed mutual programs with other
capital markets, dubbed “stock connect,” to increase mutual market
access for retail and institutional investors outside the QFII license
and quota scheme detailed above. Currently, mutual stock connects
exist with the stock exchanges of Hong Kong and London.24
20
For simplicity, when discussing foreign investment in China’s capital
market, I only discuss investments in “A shares,” which are common shares of
China-domiciled listed companies that trade on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock
exchanges in Renminbi (the Chinese currency). Alternatively, foreign investors
interested in accessing China’s capital market can also purchase and trade “B
shares” or “H shares.” These share types trade in foreign currencies and are not
subject to the QFII quota regime. The market scope of B and H shares is relatively
small and most foreign investments in China’s capital market today are done in A
shares.
21
Abolish Restrictions on the Investment Quota of Qualified Foreign Investors
(QFII/ RQFII) and Further Expand the Opening up of Financial Markets, SAFE NEWS
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2019/0910/1552.html
[https://perma.cc/2TDC-TUNM].
22 List of QFIIs (until Oct. 2019), CHINA SEC. REGUL. COMM’N (Oct. 23, 2019),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/OpeningUp/RelatedLists/QFIIs/201912/
t20191223_368109.html [https://perma.cc/ZHR7-ELDU].
23
CSRC , PBC, and SAFE Release the Measures for the Administration of Domestic
Securities and Futures Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors and RMB
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, CHINA SEC. REGUL. COMM’N (Sept. 25, 2020),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/202009/t20200925_383
652.html [https://perma.cc/SD4L-Z4ZW].
24
These mutual schemes include the Shanghai-Hong Kong and the ShenzhenHong Kong stock connect initiatives, the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition
of Funds, and the Shanghai-London Stock Connect Initiative. The first two stockconnect initiatives between the mainland and Hong Kong allow retail and
institutional investors in each market mutual access to purchase shares listed in the
other market, respectively. Huang (Robin) Hui, “一国两制”背景下的香港与内地证
券 监 管 合 作 体 制 ： 历 史 演 变 与 前 景 展 望 [The Prospect and Evolution of the
Securities Regulatory Cooperative Regime between Hong Kong and Mainland
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Foreign demand for investment quotas in China’s capital market
has further risen in recent years after several leading global indices
and rating agencies, such as MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P, began
including firms listed in China in their global equity indices.25 The
inclusion of China’s A share firms in these global indices, and their
growing weight in the indices,26 have boosted the financial exposure
of foreign investors to China’s capital market through funds that
follow these indices.27
While the overall level of foreign investment in China’s capital
market is still very small, assessed at about three percent of the total
market, 28 it is not due to low demand on part of investors. The
limited relaxation of Chinese restrictions on foreign investments, as
detailed above, resulted in the growth of foreign investments in
China’s capital market from 105 billion USD of capital assets in 2013

China under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Arrangement], (Bijiaofa Yanjiu) [J.
COMPAR. L.], no. 5, 2017 at 12. The Shanghai-LSE stock-connect is additionally
designed to enable the listing of firms from each market at Shanghai/LSE stock
exchanges, respectively, through depositary receipts.
25
In 2018, both FTSE Russell and Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) Emerging Markets Index, have begun tracking China’s capital market and
thereafter gradually increased the weight of Chinese A shares in their indices. See
China:
Evolving
the
Emerging
Markets
Landscape,
FTSE
RUSSELL,
https://www.ftserussell.com/index/spotlight/china-indexes
[https://perma.cc/NJ7U-U9TS].; MSCI Announces the Results of the 2020 Annual
Market Classification Review, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/market-classification
[https://perma.cc/P4CZ-2EES].
26
For example, Chinese firms listed in China (A shares) comprise thirty-three
percent of MSCI’s emerging markets index. Emel Akan, Leading Global Index Provider
MSCI Has No Plans to Decouple from China, EPOCH TIMES (May 1, 2020),
https://www.theepochtimes.com/leading-global-index-provider-msci-has-noplans-to-decouple-from-china_3334060.html [https://perma.cc/R5BB-96NL].
27
See, e.g., Complete Guide to Chinese Share Classes & China ETF Investing,
ETF.COM
3
(Feb.
2013),
https://www.etf.com/docs/022013_IU_GuideToChineseShare.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MFY3-KSAZ] (noting ETFs’ (Exchange Traded Fund) exposure
to China’s capital market per share type).
28
Liu Caiping & Timmy Shen, In Depth: Progress and Pitfalls for Foreign
Investors in China’s Capital Markets, CAIXIN GLOBAL (Jun. 18, 2020, 8:28 PM),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-06-18/in-depth-progress-and-pitfalls-forforeign-investors-in-chinas-capital-markets-101569516.html;
cf.
Narayanan
Somasundaram, China’s Stock Market Rally Gets Extra Push from Foreign Investors,
NIKKEI
ASIA
(Aug.
20,
2020,
11:57
JST),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/China-s-stock-market-rally-getsextra-push-from-foreigninvestors#:~:text=HONG%20KONG%20%2D%2D%20The%20rally,has%20not%2
0reached%20stock%20markets [https://perma.cc/FT5Y-W98E].
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to 594 billion USD by the first quarter of 2020.29 The U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission estimated that 586 American mutual
funds are currently invested in China’s A share markets, with a
dollar amount exposure of 37.2 billion USD. 30 Interestingly, this
investment scope had only risen amidst the so-called U.S. “economic
decoupling” from China.
b. China-Based Firms Accessing Global Financial Markets
Access to public finance and the rising relevance of Chinese
firms to foreign investors goes beyond China’s domestic market. As
China’s integration with global markets expands, so does the access
of Chinese firms to global finance—a matter that now attracts the
attention of policymakers.31
Close to two thousand Chinese firms have issued their shares (or
depositary receipts) for trade outside China. These include Chinese
companies incorporated in China and China-based companies that
are incorporated outside mainland China but are commonly
regarded as Chinese firms. 32 I refer to these firms hereafter as
“China-based issuers.”
29
This includes equity capital and corporate bonds. Nicholas R. Lardy &
Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial Decoupling is Not Happening,
PETERSON
INST.
INT.
ECON.
(July
2,
2020,
11:15
AM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-chinafinancial-decoupling-not-happening [https://perma.cc/UVC2-SE4G].
30
These estimates include only exposure to A shares by U.S. mutual funds.
Other investment vehicles such as public and private pension funds, ETFs, and
hedge funds are not included in these estimates. U.S. Investors’ Exposure to Domestic
Chinese Issuers, SEC DIV. ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS 4 (July 6, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Investors-Exposure-to-Domestic-ChineseIssuers_2020.07.06.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY6T-V4EY].
31
See infra Part V.
32
There are methodological differences in various studies and databases with
respect to when a company is identified as a “Chinese company.” The PRC
Company law defines a PRC company as a company that is incorporated in China.
The place of domicile is determined according to the company’s main registered
office. See infra note 153. The USCC, for example, infra note 36, at 1, identifies a
firm as a Chinese firm according to its principal executive office as reported in its
U.S. filings. Other firms based in China, while their place of incorporation and main
office registered outside of China, are also commonly referred to as “Chinese
companies.” When identifying such firms as “Chinese firms,” analysts may
consider the source of the firm’s assets or revenue: commonly a company would be
considered China-based and thus viewed as a Chinese company, when the majority
of its operating assets or revenues are sourced in China even while having its place
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Approximately 1,150 companies out of the total number of firms
listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange—a major international
financial gateway—are ultimately Chinese issuers. Chinese issuers,
therefore, represent close to fifty-one percent of all firms listed in
Hong Kong and seventy-one percent of total market capitalization.33
Foreign investors can thus more freely increase their exposure to
Chinese firms through the Hong Kong market.
The second-most popular offshore listing destination for
Chinese firms is the U.S. market.34 A Chinese firm issuing shares in
the U.S. market can take one of two paths—issuing its shares as a
“foreign issuer” or as a U.S.-domiciled entity.
i.

Chinese Firms as U.S. Foreign Issuers35

Over 200 China-based U.S. foreign issuers are listed for trade on
the three largest stock exchanges in the United States—Nasdaq,
NYSE, and NYSE American,36 with a total market capitalization of
of incorporation and domicile outside China. Another common indicator is the
identity of the company’s majority owners, controllers, and insiders.
33
Based on a total of 2,315 listed firms. The fifty-one percent ratio includes
Chinese firms that are listed in Hong Kong regardless of their domicile [i.e., Chinaincorporated companies, issuers of H shares; P chip companies (firms incorporated
outside China with more than fifty percent operating income sourced in China);
and Red chip companies (firms incorporated outside China in which the Chinese
government holds dominant, often controlling, ownership)]. See Ganggu Zhongzigu
Baokuo Na ji Lei? [港股中资股包括哪几类?] (What Types of Hong Kong and Chinese
Stocks are Included?), QQ SEC. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:37),
https://stock.qq.com/a/20171023/015733 [https://perma.cc/AL2L-Z4JE].
34
For the distribution of total Chinese firms listed offshore, see Fengshua Pan
and Daniel Brooker, Going Global? Examining the Geography of Chinese Firms’ Overseas
Listings on International Stock Exchanges, 52 GEOFORUM 1, 4-5 (2014) (based on 19912011 data, Chinese firms listed offshore preferred the exchanges in Hong Kong, the
United States, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, in this order).
35
“The term foreign issuer means any issuer which is a foreign government, a
national of any foreign country or a corporation or other organization incorporated
or organized under the laws of any foreign country.” 17 C.F.R. §230.405 (2020); 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b–4 (2020).
36
This number only accounts for China-based foreign issuers, thus excludes
China-based issuers that are incorporated in the United States. It also does not
include firms that trade Over the Counter (OTC). See U.S.-CHINA ECON. and SEC.
REV. COMM’N, CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON MAJOR U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES (2020)
[hereinafter USCC Report], https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/202010/Chinese_Companies_on_US_Stock_Exchanges_10-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NY5B-5AAD] (reporting on 217 Chinese firms listed in the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

934

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

$2.2 trillion. 37
Interestingly, notwithstanding the recent
deterioration of U.S.-China relations, seventy-nine of these
companies have listed their shares in the United States in the past
three years alone (2018-October 2020), representing 8.8 percent of
total U.S. IPOs in the same period.38
Some of the Chinese firms that list in the United States as foreign
issuers are incorporated in China and thirteen such firms formally
identify as national-level State-owned enterprises (SOEs), controlled
by the PRC central government. 39 But most of these firms are
ostensibly private firms that are incorporated outside China (mainly
in Hong Kong or in tax havens such as Cayman Island and the
British Virgin Islands) 40 and employ structures that make their
identification as Chinese firms more difficult.41 Based on intricate

United States, twenty-seven of them are U.S.-domiciled); cf, List of Chinese Companies
that
Trade
on
U.S.
Stock
Exchanges,
STOCK
MARKET
MBA,
https://stockmarketmba.com/chinesecompaniesthattradeonusexchanges.php#
(last updated Nov. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A97Z-UUXH] (including 276 total
Chinese companies that are listed on the main boards as well as OTC, through both
direct listings (approximately seventy-three) as well as ADRs (American
Depositary Receipts, approximately 154)).
37
USCC Report, supra note 36, at 1.
38
The number of recent Chinese IPOs is drawn from the USCC Report, supra
note 36, and is based on the year of IPO until October 2020. In 2020, there has been
a sharp decline of Chinese IPOs in the U.S. market and a parallel increase in the
number of total U.S. IPOs. These factors have reduced the percentage of new
Chinese IPOs in the U.S. market over the three-year period from 12.2% (2017-2019)
to 8.8% (2018-2020). The total number of US IPOs is drawn from various media
reports.
See,
e.g.,
IPO
Statistics,
STOCK
ANALYSIS,
https://stockanalysis.com/ipos/statistics/[https://perma.cc/8H6P-CPHN]; cf.
Stephen Grocer, Chinese Companies Flocked to U.S. Markets in 2018. The Trade War
May
Have
Had
a
Role,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/dealbook/trade-war-chinaipos.html [https://perma.cc/5W9U-TE6S].
39
USCC Report, supra note 36, at 1 n.4. State ownership and control in many
of these offshore listed firms is likely much more pervasive than indicated by the
formal directory relied upon in the report.
40
William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 24-25) (identifying a total of 243 “Chinese
corporations” as U.S. issuers, using the firms’ main registered headquarters and
place of incorporation. Out of the total, Cayman Islands were found to be the home
of 62.1% of the firms, British Virgin Island 12.8%, and China only 4.5%).
41
USCC Report, supra note 36, at 1 (noting the number of U.S.-listed Chinese
firms does not reflect the full number of Chinese firms listed in the United States as
some Chinese firms relay on offshore registration which makes tracking their China
operations difficult).
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structures,42 these firms can list offshore and gain access to foreign
capital while keeping most of their operating assets (including
licenses) with a China-domiciled company (an operating entity).
Public investors have economic and decision-making rights in the
operating entity based on contractual agreements with its owners.43
ii.

China-Based Firms as U.S.-Domiciled Issuers

In addition to China-based U.S. foreign issuers, hundreds of
firms were listed for trade in the U.S. market as domestic-U.S.
firms,44 while their meaningful operating assets similarly remained
in China. Many of these firms entered the U.S. capital market in the
late 2000s through a “back door listing” (also known as a reverse
merger), which at that time was a common method for foreign firms
to access the U.S. capital market.45 Through this method, a Chinese
company merged into a U.S. publicly listed shell entity that had
nominal or no operations and assets of its own. The Chinese
42
A dominant structure employed by China-based U.S. issuers is the
“Variable Interest Entity” structure (VIE), commonly used by firms that wish to
raise foreign capital but operate in industries in which foreign ownership is limited
according to Chinese law. Commentators estimate that close to seventy percent of
China-based firms that are listed for trade in the United States employ a VIE
structure. At its most basic level, the VIE structure opens access to foreign capital
while sidestepping requirements for Chinese regulatory approvals by maintaining
de facto control over licenses and operating assets with a Chinese entity (the VIE).
Foreign investors hold shares in an offshore listed company that has little or no
operating assets but may hold intellectual-property rights, domain names, etc. as
well as profit sharing and voting rights in the Chinese operating company (the VIE)
through contractual agreements (through an additional intermediary Chinadomiciled wholly foreign owned entity). On the structure and its purposes see
Paul L. Gillis and Fredrik Oqvist, Variable Interest Entities in China, GMT RSCH.
(March 13, 2019), https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/2019-03-viegillis.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2F2-NJM3].
43
For a discussion about the associated risks for foreign investors, see
BRANDON WHITEHALL, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, BUYER BEWARE:
CHINESE COMPANIES AND THE VIE STRUCTURE (2017); U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV.,
2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 127-77 (2019).
44
Based on a 2019 Bloomberg search, Fried and Kamar found 220 U.Sdomiciled yet China-based firms listed in the U.S. market. Jesse M. Fried and Ehud
Kamar, China and the Rise of Law-Proof Insiders 1 n.5 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 557/2020, 2020).
45
David K. Cheng, Cindy Zhu & David Lee, Reverse Mergers by China-Based
CompaniesIs This the End?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jul. 11, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/reverse-mergers-by-chinabased-companies-is-this-the-end [https://perma.cc/36EF-BSKR].
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company then became a subsidiary of the U.S.-listed firm, which
then ceased its shell status and resumed trade. The original owners
of the Chinese company typically received controlling interests in
the U.S.-listed firm. This organizational structure enabled access to
the U.S. capital market without the regulatory approval process
otherwise required for an IPO.
Consequently, the entity that survives the merger passes as a
domestic U.S. listed company for all regulatory purposes, even
while most of its operating assets remain in China and while having
PRC entities or individuals as its ultimate controlling shareholders
and insiders.46
c. The Puzzle
The review above is intended to bring forth the ways through
which Chinese firms (broadly defined) can raise public finance from
foreign investors, both in China and through global markets, and the
current scopes of such foreign investments.
To clarify, access to foreign-sourced capital through the two
pathways described above does not mean that China is completely
integrated with global financial markets. Far from it. The Chinese
government still controls cross-border financial flows.
China’s foreign accounts control prevents the easy flow of
capital in and out of China, and a pre-approval system for offshore
listing poses challenges for firms seeking finance outside China. 47
46
On litigations following claims against China-based reverse merger firms
and their insiders, see id. On the potential harmful effect of reverse mergers on
investors’ value, see Bill Alpert & Leslie P. Norton, Beware this Chinese Import,
BARRON’S
(Aug.
28,
2010),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405297020430440457544981294318
3940 [https://perma.cc/NQJ4-758K]; cf. Charles M.C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran
Zhang, Shell Games: The Long-Term Performance of Chinese Reverse-Merger Firms, 90
ACCT. REV. 1547, 1547-1589 (2015) (comparing the long-term performance of reverse
merger listed firms, finding that Chinese reverse mergers are not inherently “toxic”
and even outperform their peers, contrary to common critique).
47
Guowuyuan guanyu Gufenyouxian Gongsi jingway Muji Gufen ji Shangshi
de tebie Guiding [ 国务院关 于股份有限 公司境外募 集股 份及上市的 特别规 定]
(Special Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Floatation and Listing
Abroad of Stocks by Limited Stock Companies) (promulgated by Ministry of Com.,
July
4,
1994),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/2002110005
0791.shtml [https://perma.cc/T6G4-U2JK]. Such requirements for pre-approval
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Restrictions on the scope of foreign investments, 48 limitations on
foreign ownership in certain industries including in financial
institutions and services,49 as well as the inability of foreign firms to
issue and trade securities in China’s domestic capital market,50 are
additional impediments. While many of these have been gradually
partially relaxed in recent years, they still hold back integration with
global financial markets.

play a major role in pushing firms to develop innovative structures for listing
offshore without the need for such regulatory process (e.g., reverse mergers and
VIEs).
48 See text accompanying supra notes 19-28.
49
China has recently relaxed some of its foreign ownership limitations in the
financial industry. See, e.g., Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Jinrong ye duiwai Kaifangde
youguan Jucuo [关于进一步扩大金融业对外开放的有关举措] (Relevant Measures to
Further Expand the Opening Up of the Financial Industry) (promulgated by Office
of the St. Council Fin. Stability and Dev. Comm., July 21, 2019),
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-07/21/content_5412293.htm
[https://perma.cc/U3EY-A9CD]. Following these steps, PayPal was permitted to
acquire a seventy percent equity ownership of Chinese GoPay; Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley were approved to increase their stakes in several joint venture
financial institutions to fifty-one percent ownership; JP Morgan was permitted to
establish a first of its kind Wholly Foreign-Owned (WFOE) financial futures firm;
BlackRock received initial approval to establish a mutual fund WFOE; several
foreign financial institutions pursued licenses to provide financial clearing services
through joint ventures; and two American financial firms were licensed to conduct
financial rating services with respect to China’s domestic institutions. Nicholas R.
Lardy & Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial Decoupling is Not
Happening, PIIE (July 2, 2020, 11:15 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/chinaeconomic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-china-financial-decoupling-not-happening
[https://perma.cc/8M8S-CK9R].
50
But see the recent Shanghai—London Stock Exchange Connect which is said
to enable the cross-listing of LSE public firms in Shanghai (through the issuance of
depositary receipts) and vis’ versa. So far, however, only one listing in the opposite
direction was accomplishedthe cross listing of Huatai Securities Co. Ltd. (a
Chinese firm listed in SSE and HKSE) on LSE. Launch of the Shanghai-London Stock
Connect: Joint Announcement made by CSRC and FCA, BAKER MCKENZIE FENXUN (June
2019),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/07/launchshanghai-london-stock-connect [https://perma.cc/9REX-HPQL]. Another listing
of a Shanghai listed company, China Pacific Insurance, one of China’s biggest
insurance firms, has been recently granted an approval to cross-list on LSE. Yujing
Liu, China Approves Second Listing for Shanghai-London Stock Connect amid Strained
Sino-British Ties, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 3, 2020, 3:18 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/3087343/china-approvessecond-listing-shanghai-london-stock-connect-amid
[https://perma.cc/9FWJTLXH].
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Nonetheless, the above reflects that global financial integration
has accelerated. 51 The flow of public finance, as an aspect of
financial integration, helps facilitate the expansion of Chinese firms,
and supports China’s economic development and growth.
The demand for public investments is clear; Chinese firms need
external finance to grow. Financial integration with global markets
gives firms access to a broader base of capital, and the Chinese
government is gradually accommodating such needs by relaxing
prior access limitations.
Yet, the supply side is more puzzling. What attracts suppliers of
finance to Chinese firms? What sustains the allure of Chinese firms
to foreign investors particularly?52 Such allure is puzzling especially
considering fundamental assumptions underlying development
orthodoxies and prevailing corporate governance theories.
Conventional wisdom in these lines of literature holds private
ownership as the key engine for the growth of firms and for deep
capital markets,53 while state ownership and political influence in
firms are deemed to be impediments.54 Relatedly, prevailing market
theories view robust legal institutions—particularly those
associated with investor protections—as preconditions for the flow
of external finance. 55 Where legal systems are weak and market
51
For a brief review of recent efforts to further enable foreign integration, see
Karen Yiqin Fan, Peter Corne & Celine Zhang, Update on China’s Recent Liberalization
of the Legal Regime for Foreign Investment, DORSEY (September 30, 2019),
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/clientalerts/2019/09/china-recent-liberalization-for-foreign-investment
[https://perma.cc/6954-Q9SV].
52
Foreign investors are different from most domestic Chinese investors in two
main respectsthey invest mainly through sophisticated institutional investors
(while the sheer number of domestic investors are retail investors), and they have
various investment alternatives outside China that can substitute for their desired
level of portfolio exposure to emerging markets (while Chinese investments in
offshore markets is extremely limited).
53
MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA
(1995) (arguing that in order to achieve economic growth, firms should be depoliticized, and the state should be distanced from ownership through
privatization).
54 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 521 (2001) (noting that government intervention might
slow growth). The argument is also supported by studies noted in Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302 (2008).
55
This line of argument is known as the “Law and Finance” approach. See
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 431 (2008); Rafael La Porta,
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forces are yet to be fully developed, it is argued, unmonitored
corporate controllers and insiders will bleed-out corporations from
cash and value. Managerial opportunism, self-dealing, and the
abuse of investors will push finance away.
Four decades of economic development in China, however,
challenge these fundamental assumptions. Chinese firms with or
without state ownership can now choose whether to raise public
finance through China’s domestic capital market or to expand their
financing efforts offshore. In both paths, suppliers of capital do not
shy away from Chinese firms.
Popular views explain the appeal of Chinese firms to be the
result of the irrationality of investors; a market frenzy causing a
bubble; or investors’ fear of missing out. 56 Irrationality-type
answers might explain the interest of speculative retail investors and
their meaningful share in China’s capital market,57 but they seem illsuited for sophisticated foreign institutional investors. Such
investors are mainly guided by investment analyses as to China’s
growth opportunities and by economic diversification rationale. 58
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants
of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1145 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113,
1116 (1998). For a similar study that addresses emerging markets and transitional
economies, see Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopezde-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COM. ECON. 595
(2003). Critiques of the approach are not lacking. See, e.g., HOLGER SPAMANN, LAW
AND FINANCE REVISITED (2008); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great
Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON
5 (2003).
56
See e.g., STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET 118-153 (2003); Christopher
A. Iacovella, Why Are American Investors Funding Chinese Fraud?, REALCLEAR POL.
(Oct.
19,
2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/10/19/why_are_american_inv
estors_funding_chinese_fraud_141540.html
[https://perma.cc/5TEV-LR9M]
(labeling such investors’ sentiments: “‘you can’t miss out on China growth’
narrative”).
57
For the relative sheer size of retail investors compared with institutional
investments in each of China’s stock exchanges, see Tamar Groswald Ozery, LAW
& POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CORPORATE CHINA: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION IN MARKET
DEVELOPMENT, Cambridge University Press (under contract), at Chapter 6.
58
Yun Li, Larry Fink Just Revealed how BlackRock is Going to Keep Growing at its
Torrid
Pace:
China,
CNBC
(Apr.
8,
2019,
9:15
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/08/larry-fink-just-revealed-how-blackrock-isgoing-to-keep-growing-at-its-torrent-pace-china.html [https://perma.cc/72AQJ34F] (referring to Mr. Fink’s perspective of China as one of the largest future
growth opportunities for BlackRock who aspires to become “leading global asset
managers,” and BlackRock’s investments in China as a “diversified . . . long term
investment solution”).
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Presumably, if the risks are too high, foreign institutional investors
have alternatives for portfolio diversification that would provide
desired global exposure. Furthermore, long term returns on
investment do not seem exceptionally high for Chinese firms, and
thus cannot alone substantiate a “high-risk high-gain” explanation
in the secondary market.59
Regardless of the rationale that motivates investors’ initial
interest, the continuous growth of China’s capital market, supported
by foreign finance, and the expansion of Chinese firms across global
financial markets seem to reflect a message—state ownership and
potential political control do not thwart foreign investors off
Chinese firms.
At the least, this reality suggests that foreign investors have
developed “tolerance” to state ownership and political control and
remain confident that they can benefit from investing in Chinese
firms, and in China’s market more generally, regardless of these
path-dependent features.
What is the source of investors’
confidence? What explains the availability of public finance?
Few studies have addressed this puzzle directly nor attempted
to offer an explanation. 60 Theoretically, the continued allure of
Chinese listed firms and the availability of public finance would not
be so puzzling if the system that governs these firms is somehow
superior despite heavy state ownership and control. Investors’
confidence would be easily explained if investment in Chinese firms
59
See FRANKLIN ALLEN, JUN “QJ” QIAN, CHENYU SHAN & JULIE LEI ZHU,
DISSECTING THE LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET 2 (2016)
(finding a performance gap of A share listed firms relative to externally listed and
unlisted Chinese firms, as well as to listed firms in comparative markets); cf. Qian
et al., supra note 16, at 5 (observing excessive initial returns for 3 years following an
IPO due to underpricing, then “lukewarm” long term returns). High returns
immediately following an IPO could explain IPO oversubscriptions but is more
problematic when trying to understand continuous availability of capital in the
secondary market.
60
Numerous related studies address different aspects in China’s economic
growth puzzle. See infra notes 161 & 166. In the legal context, a few notable studies
include: Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Right Hypothesis: The China
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 97 (2003) (resolving some aspects of the puzzle
through a distinction between property rights and contract rights: “a reasonable
assurance to would-be investors that the fruits of their investment will not be
confiscated unpredictably is far more important to economic development than a
formal legal system that enforces contract rights.”); Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz
to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for the Law and Development
Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 551, 551-602 (2009); and more generally, John
K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies
and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 219 (2007).
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does not entail particularly significant risks. Perhaps corporate
culture in China is uniquely not susceptible to investor abuse.
Alternatively, notwithstanding state ownership and control and
the particular risks that may or may not emanate from such features,
investors’ confidence could be explained if their interests are
sufficiently protected. Perhaps something, somewhere along the
system, balances-off or at least mitigates potential investment risks
to acceptable levels.
To consider these possibilities, I now turn to discuss some of the
organizational and governance attributes commonly found in
Chinese public firms, whether listed domestically or offshore. I
illuminate potential risks for public investors and discuss examples
that reflect the inability of conventional corporate governance
mechanisms to mitigate such risks, before considering other
explanations for the puzzle in Part IV.
III.

CONVENTIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS
WEAKNESSES

Publicly listed firms in China emerged in the early 1990s through
an industrial reorganization process known by scholars as China’s
“corporatization without privatization.” Corporatization meant
reorganizing State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as one of the three
corporate forms that were recognized in China’s newly enacted
Company Law. 61 The process, at least formally, also intended to
gradually shift the control over state assets from the state, as the
absolute owner of industrial enterprises, to professional managers.
The new corporations embraced a “modern enterprise system” by
adopting attributes of advanced corporations elsewhere, including
corporate legal personhood, limited liability, and transferability of
rights.
A U.S.-style separation between ownership and
management was formally adopted. Social welfare functions that
were the responsibility of enterprises under the planned economy
were removed, and shares were issued to signify the ownership
interest of the state.

61 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [中华人民共和国公司法] (The
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China), (promulgated by Standing
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, last amended Oct. 26, 2018, effective
Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter “the Company Law” or “2005 Company Law”].
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Almost simultaneously, these now-corporatized SOEs turned to
China’s newly established stock exchanges to raise capital. They
issued their shares to domestic and foreign investors, while
strategically refraining from privatization and maintaining a
substantial block of shares, and often control, with the state.62 With
time, pyramid holding groups and mixed ownership structures
were created around many of China’s corporatized and now-listed
“SOEs,” diluting the state’s direct share ownership while preserving
its control rights.
A pyramid group structure is common around the world. This
organizational structure enables controlling shareholders to issue
stocks to the public while maintaining and even enlarging their
voting control relative to their cash flow rights through a holding
company.63 Mixed-ownership is a more novel ownership structure
that combines the equity stakes of private shareholders with stateholdings in the same firm. Like the public listing of subsidiaries in
holding group structures, mix-ownership was branded as a plan to
“privatize” Chinese SOEs,64 but in fact only entrenched the state as
a controlling shareholder in many such “privatized” firms.

Jiang & Kim, supra note 7, at 191-92.
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2000).
64
Defined as: “cross-shareholdings by, and mutual blends of, state-owned
capital, collective capital, and non-public capital.” Zhongguo gongchandang di
shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao [中国共产党第十八
届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报] (Decision of the Cent. Comm. of the Communist
Party of China on Several Major Issues of Comprehensively Deeping Reform)
(promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Cent. Comm. of the
Communist Party of China, Nov. 12, 2013), [hereinafter Communique 2013]
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/201401/15/content_31203056.htm [https://perma.cc/736B-WGDK].
This was
followed by detailed CCP decisions to guide central and local state organs
(including the NPC and the State Council on its various ministries) on how to
implement and pursue the mixed ownership goal. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu
Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [中共中央关于全面
深化改革若干重大问题的决定] (Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the
Comprehensive Deepening of Reform) (promulgated by the Central Comm.
Communist Party China, Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter The 3 rd Plenum Decisions of
2013],
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html
[https://perma.cc/AQX9-2UFJ]. See generally DANIEL H. ROSEN, AVOIDING THE
BLIND ALLEY: CHINA’S ECONOMIC OVERHAUL AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS (2014)
(providing critical analysis).
62

63
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At the outcome of these processes, the Chinese Party-state65—
including central and local governments, ministries, and other state
bodies—retained, and in fact, leveraged, its ultimate control over
numerous listed companies.66 The prevailing corporate ownership
structures in China, therefore, enable organs of the central and local
government, through holding-companies and mixed-ownership, to
maintain their controlling positions in many firms even while
sometimes holding only a minority stake directly.
Naturally, the state operates through powerful human
appointees as corporate insiders—a fact that introduces monitoring
challenges and abundant opportunities for the abuse of public
shareholders, affecting both their governance and economic rights.
These ownership structures are also potentially self-perpetuating.
They help entrench controlling parties in ways that muddle the
prospect for shareholder-rights reform.
I now turn to explain how these structures turned conducive to
various forms of investors’ abuse. Importantly, these ownership
structures and their consequent attributes characterize many of
China’s publicly listed firms. The implications apply across China’s
business sector and extend onto public firms with minimal to no
state ownership, whether they are listed for trade domestically in
China or offshore.
a. Concerns for Public Investors
i.

Excess Opportunities for Self-Dealing by Agents

Where ownership is concentrated the dominant shareholder is
the main beneficiary of any value increase in the firm. The dominant
shareholder is, therefore, assumed to be best incentivized to monitor
the behavior of corporate managers and other insiders. With
65
The term “Party-state” refers to a one-party system in which one political
party directs both the political process and the administrative governance of the
state.
66
As part of the Mixed-ownership scheme, for example, the number of listed
firms owned by either the central or local government has increased from 344 to 368
for central firms and from 662 to 700 for local firms. Hao Chen & Meg Rithmire,
The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy, 55 STUD. COMPAR.
INT’L DEV. 257, 263 (2020). For a more general discussion of the market structure
and state dominance during the corporatization period, see Liufang Fang, China’s
Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 149, 224-228 (1995).
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abundant inside information, dominant shareholders can also
efficiently preempt market reactions by identifying managerial slack
early and simply replace ill-performing managers.
Where the government is the dominant shareholder, however,
no ultimate real principal exists at the top of the state’s holdings.
There is no real principal who would personally benefit from
monitoring and thus no one with the incentive to monitor the
behavior of corporate managers. This structural predicament
became known in China as the “absentee principal” or the “absent
owner” (suoyouzhe quewei). 67 This situation leads to the relative
apathy of government officials toward corporate misconduct, even
though in theory, as the representatives of the controlling-state
shareholder, they should have been those most interested in curbing
corporate malfeasance.68
Consequently, firms in China became controlled by
unmonitored powerful insiders (neiburen kongzhi). Related party
transactions facilitated vast self-dealing not only by the insiders
themselves but also by the agents assigned by the state to supervise
them.69 The modern corporate form employed in SOEs, therefore,
became conducive not only to self-dealing but to corruption as
well.70
Various organizational schemes at the state-level were
introduced to deal with these structural predicaments with respect
to SOEs. Primary among them was the 2003 establishment of a
67
Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 4 CHINA
ECON. REV. 494, 499 (2003).
68 Id. at 498 (“Yet calls for government-owned enterprises to be independent
of government ‘interference’ are calls for nothing short of utter nonaccountability
for management.”).
69
Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 148 (2006) (“[A] 2002 study of corporate governance by the
CSRC and the SETC revealed, on the basis of self-reporting alone, that forty percent
of listed companies engaged in related-party transactions with their top ten
shareholders.”); see also Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to
Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243,
248 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (“‘Tunnelling’ by individual insiders and
controlling shareholders, both state and non-state, by means of related-party
transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunnelling by controlling shareholders was
estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in
stock markets in the same year.”); Ming Jian & T. J. Wong, Propping Through Related
Party Transactions, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 70, 98 (2010) (finding that abnormal related
sales propping done for the benefit of the controller is more prevalent among stateowned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions).
70 See infra, Part IV. B.1.
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national state-asset management agency71—the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission [SASAC]. SASAC
was designed to function as a unified national, ministry-level agency
that will shoulder the State Council’s (the central Chinese
government) role as a shareholder, including in the monitoring of
corporate insiders and in exercising shareholder governance
rights. 72 Yet, the agency faces strong resistance from various
interested parties within China’s political-economic system that
weaken its authority: other national-level ministries with a say in
relevant industries compete with SASAC on regulatory powers. 73
Some of the firms under its supervision and apparent control are
also ministry-level, economically powerful industry behemoths,
which can challenge its supervision and enforcement capacities.74
Furthermore, SASAC exercises its governance powers, and
particularly its control rights in management, in the shadow of an
overall Communist Party control.75 More recently, this control has
been formalized and institutionalized into the governance of
corporatized SOEs and firms more generally, 76 a change that is
further undermining the corporate capacity and administrative
authority formally reserved to SASAC.

71
The formal capacity of SASAC to act as the shareholder on behalf of the
state was established in law only six years after the agency was created. Zhonghua
Renming Gongheuo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa [中华人民共和国企业国有资产法]
(Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises)
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 28, 2008,
effective May 1, 2009), arts. 1, 3, [hereinafter SOE Assets Law]
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law [https://perma.cc/ZY2Z266B].
72
Main
Functions,
SASAC,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170831013424/http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028
/n1408521/index.html (last visited May 24, 2019).
73
See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions:
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 72628 (2013)
74 Id. at 736.
75 Id. at 737-38 (referring to this relationship as “a highly institutionalized
sharing arrangement between the Party and SASAC.”).
76
See generally Tamar Groswald Ozery, The Politicization of Corporate
Governance—A Viable Alternative?, AM. J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript
at
15-45)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608727 (discussing the
recent “politization of corporate governance” in China, in which political
institutions with corporate governance functions have been institutionalized both
internally and externally to firms).
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At the crossroad of these competing forces are the corporate
insiders and Party-state affiliated individuals who stand to gain
from the disarray of conflicting institutional interests.
The
separation of ownership and control during the corporatization
process imported the paradigmatic vertical agency problem into a
system with an already complex range of idiosyncratic institutional
monitoring challenges.
State corporate control in China, therefore, features the same
type of insider self-dealing concerns that the paradigm agency costs
analysis envisages, yet it amplifies the problem by reproducing the
links (agents) in the chain that can exploit the situation while
weakening those with direct incentives to limit it. This is an
exacerbated form of the well-known corporate monitoring
predicament—“who monitors the monitors?”77 which multiplies in
China across layers of agents inside and outside the firm.78
Even in the private sector—China’s business elite and its
political elite are highly interconnected through dependencies on
network relations, political incentives, and career trajectories.79 The
comingling of interests supports corruption and reduces the
incentives to monitor and enforce against corporate wrongdoing in
the private sector as well.

77 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 835-836 (1981)
(discussing this question as part of the costs of the separation between ownership
and control).
78
See Tamar Groswald Ozery, Minority Public Shareholders in China’s
Concentrated Capital Markets—A New Paradigm?, 30 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 11 (2016).
79
See Alex Bryson, John Forth & Minghai Zhou, How Much Influence Does the
Chinese State Have over CEOs and Their Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION 1 (Jaime Ortega ed., 2014) (finding that government
involvement in the appointment of senior management extends beyond stateowned firms into privately owned firms and across industrial sectors). Milhaupt &
Zheng, supra note 6, at 684 (identifying ninety-five out of the top one hundred
private Chinese firms by revenue and eight out of the top ten internet firms to be
controlled by a current or former member of a central or local political
organization).
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Empirical research points to the prevalence of tunneling in
Chinese public firms,80 whether state or privately owned.81 The use
of related party transactions, particularly intra-group transfers and
loan guarantees,82 which shift resources from publicly listed firms to
related parties, are especially noted in these studies.83
These excess opportunities for self-dealing and tunneling affect
the governance of China’s public firms and increase the potential
harmful effect on firm value at the expense of public investors in
these firms.

80
Value extraction by corporate controlling shareholders at the expense of
minority shareholders received the name “tunneling.” For the seminal works on
tunneling, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling
Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003), and Simon Johnson, Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
22 (2000).
81
See, e.g., Kun Su, Liuchuang Li & Rui Wan, Ultimate Ownership, Risk-taking
and Firm Value: Evidence from China, 23 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 10 (2017) (examining the
results of risk taking and ownership structure in Chinese listed firms and finding
that the presence of ultimate controlling shareholder, and the divergence between
its control right and cash flow right through pyramid structures, lead to lower
corporate risk-taking and firm value); Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling
Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence from China, 30 J. ACCT.
PUB. POL’Y 89 (2011) (discussing how tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces
the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and suggesting that
controlling shareholders have less interest to strengthen pay for performance
measures due to their ability to extract value through private benefits of control).
82
See Guohua Jiang, Charles M.C. Lee & Heng Yue, Tunneling through InterCorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (discussing the scope of
abuse by controlling shareholders through the use of intercorporate loans between
1996–2006); Qiao Liu & Zhou (Joe) Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings
Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN.
881 (2007) (finding evidence which suggests that controlling shareholders use
earnings management to tunnel); cf Winnie Qian Peng, K.C. John Wei & Zhishu
Yang, Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J.
CORP. FIN. 306 (2011) (corroborating tunneling in financially sound firms but
showing that controlling shareholders also employ connected transactions to prop
up firms in financial distress and support their stability).
83
See, e.g., Nan Jia, Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang, Coinsurance within Business
Groups: Evidence from Related Party Transactions in an Emerging Market, 59 MGMT. SCI.
2295 (2013) (discussing the results of a transaction-level study that demonstrated
evidence of a “coinsurance” effect among Chinese business group); Henk Berkman,
Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related
Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 141 (2009) (examining loan
guarantees among public traded Chinese firms and finding evidence of firms
expropriating minority-shareholder wealth).
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Potential State “Expropriation”

As if the above features of corporate organization in China are
not challenging enough, investors in corporatized SOEs face further
difficulties due to a potential clash of interests with the state as the
controlling shareholder in many of these firms.
It is well established that controlling shareholders can promote
their interests more easily by enlarging their voting control relative
to their cash flow rights.84 This can be done through deploying legal
structures, such as pyramidal ownership, dual-class shares, crossshareholdings within business groups, voting agreements, and
other business arrangements. 85 The result (and often the aim) of
these ownership structures is the dissociation of public investors
from governance, which allows the controller to extract private
benefits of control more freely.86 In the case of state control, such
“tunneling” may serve benevolent purposes but does not change the
potential economic outcome at the firm level.
Increasing the state’s voting control disproportionately to its
cash flow rights was actively pursued in China throughout its
market transition and until the present day—from the inception of
its corporatization process with SOEs that raised passive equity

84
See generally Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P.
Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding, 57 J.
FIN. 2741 (2002); Claessens et al., supra note 63 (analyzing the separation of
ownership and control across 2,980 East Asian corporations).
85 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis,
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (explaining the separation of
shareholder control from cash-flow rights resulting from dual class share
structures, cross-ownership ties, and stock pyramids).
86
Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006)
(“increased productivity accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity,
while private benefits of control are allocated based on governance power”). But
see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560 (2016) (suggesting that entrepreneurs value corporate control because
it allows them to pursue their vision the way they see fit, rather than necessarily to
reap private benefits at the expense of public shareholders). With respect to China,
see Jiang, Lee & Yue, supra note 82 (finding that the use of intercorporate loans by
controlling shareholders to siphon funds from publicly listed companies is most
severe in firms where the controlling shareholders’ governance rights are larger
than their ownership (cash flow) rights).
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capital while keeping state shares non-tradeable, 87 through the
reorganization of these firms into larger pyramid holding groups,
and to the recent waves of M&A activity that reduced the number
of state owned enterprises but enhanced their scope.88
Instead of relaxing ownership structures in SOEs in ways that
would better align the interests of the state with those of other
shareholders, the Party-state has opted to further deepen the gap
through its mixed-ownership scheme.89 This corporate organization
scheme entrenches the state as a controlling (sometimes controllingminority) shareholder in many such “mixed” firms.90
Interestingly, the state holds more than twenty percent
ownership in only fourteen percent of China’s publicly listed firms
(506 firms in 2018). Yet these firms account for forty percent of total
market capitalization and fifty-six percent of the listed companies’
total revenues.91 Furthermore, the state is the ultimate controller in
thirty-one percent of China’s publicly listed firms (1,101 companies,
of which 395 ultimately controlled by the central government and
706 by local governments).92
87
See generally Nicholas C. Howson, Protecting the State from Itself? Regulatory
Interventions in Corporate Governance and the Financing of China’s ‘State Capitalism’, in
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE
CAPITALISM, 49 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015); Clarke, supra
note 67, at 496-497.
88
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, The Global Financial Crisis and China’s Domestic and
International Political Options, in CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
COMPARISON WITH EUROPE 3, 5 (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Jean-Francoise Di Meglio &
Xavier Richet, 2012) (pointing out that between 2003 and 2010, the total number of
SOEs dropped from 159,000 to 114,500, but the total assets of 121 large national
SOEs managed by SASAC increased from three trillion to twenty trillion yuan).
89
On the current promotion of a “mixed ownership economy,” see discussion
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
90
Chen Yanqing, Difang Guozi ru zhu Minqi zai xian gaochao: Jinnian chao 10 jia
minying A gu Gongsi jiang Bianshen Guoqi [地方国资入主民企再掀高潮:今年超 10 家
民营 A 股公司将变身国企] (Local state-owned assets take over private enterprises and set
off another climax: more than 10 private A-share companies will become state-owned this
year),
TENCENT
NEWS:
SECURITIES
(Oct.
9,
2018),
https://stock.qq.com/a/20181009/009345.htm [https://perma.cc/FP9X-L3YK].
91
See Daniel H. Rosen, Wendy Leutert & Shan Guo, Missing Link: Corporate
Governance in China’s State Sector, ASIA SOC’Y & RHODIUM GRP. 12 (2018).
92 Id. The authors do not mention how “ultimate control” was identified but
rely on third-party commercial vendors for such determination. The 2005 PRC
Company Law, supra note 61, art. 216(2) defines a “controlling shareholder” as: a
shareholder whose capital contribution accounts for more than fifty percent of the
total equity stocks, or a shareholder whose capital contribution or proportion of
stock is less than fifty percent but who enjoys a voting right large enough to have a
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Similarly, in recent years, the state has expanded its reach into
the operations of private firms also by offering “itself as financier to
the private sector.”93 Thus, although public finance became a more
available option for private firms as well, and the ratio of
corporatized listed-SOEs in the market has decreased, the breadth
of the state’s market reach has expanded.
In its capacity as a shareholder, the state is assigned corporate
governance rights that are at least in principle more extensive than
those granted to shareholders by the Company Law.94 To note, the
state’s corporate capacity is not without reins, however. Its
shareholding capacity is exercised formally through the
shareholders’ assembly following defined corporate procedures and

significant impact upon the resolution of the shareholders’ meeting or the
shareholders’ assembly. Art. 216(3) further defines an “actual controller” as:
“anyone who is not a shareholder but is able to hold actual control of the acts of the
company by means of investment relations, agreements or any other
arrangements.”
93
Chen and Rithmire, supra note 66, at 264 (examining the growing reach of
the state through various forms of capital investments in privately owned firms);
see also Chen, supra note 90 (describing how the state “rescues” financially
distressed private firms through share acquisitions). See generally Nicholas R.
Lardy, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: THE END OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA? (2009).
94
A few examples illustrate this point. First, state bodies performing the
contributor (i.e., investor) functions have the power to propose directors and
supervisors to the shareholders’ meeting in any “state invested enterprise”
regardless of the ratio held by the state, to assess the candidates to be appointed or
proposed, as well as to determine the “standards of remuneration for managers . . .
appointed by it.” Compare SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts. 5, 22(3), 24, 27, with
2005 Company Law, supra note 61, arts. 37(2), 39, 101, 102. Second, the state is
granted a de-facto veto right on the transfer of state-assets (e.g., state shares) of any
state-invested enterprise. This gives the state a veto right in transactions that
otherwise would have been at the purview of the board. See SOE Assets Law, supra
note 71, at Sec. 5 (Transfer of State-owned Assets) (particularly arts. 51, 53). See Lin
& Milhaupt, supra note 73, at 743 n.135 (noting the need for SASAC’s approval of
share transfer in a subsidiary and related court judgements). Finally, beyond
conventional company law fiduciary obligations, the SOE Assets Law specifically
includes what seems as a fiduciary obligation of directors, supervisors, and senior
managers not only to the company but specifically to the interests of the state as a
shareholder: “[t]he directors, supervisors and senior management in state invested
enterprise . . . shall not (otherwise) damage the rights and interests of the state’s
asset contributor”; and also determining liability for actions that causes losses of
state-owned assets, including administrative accountability when such office
holders are also state functionaries. See SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts. 26 &
71.
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is therefore subject to potential scrutiny and corporate governance
limitations.95
To the extent that the state can incentivize its agents—both the
professional managers appointed to operate state-invested publiclylisted firms and the officials assigned to monitor insiders—to pursue
the state’s goals rather than their own selfish interests, the benefits
to the firm and its other stakeholders (particularly public
shareholders) might be marginalized. Whichever goal ends up
being prioritized, it will not necessarily align with the most efficient
and productive way of operation.
Thus, even under an assumption of benevolent, wellcoordinated, state asset management, as a controlling shareholder
the state may direct the firm in pursuit of objectives that simply run
counter to the interest of the individual firm as a profit-maximizing
business. 96 Examples of this in China include the use of statecontrolled firms to advance geopolitical goals without sound
expectations for economic return; 97 harnessing control over
95
The reins are enshrined in both law and political economy. For example,
the SOE Assets Law make clear that the state in its shareholder capacity will follow
the Company law procedures for shareholder deliberation and voting even with
respect to major corporate decisions. See e.g., SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts.
13, 30, 33, 46. The law also proclaims to guarantee operating autonomy and limits
intervention in day-to-day decision making. Only in limited circumstances, and
only when the state is a sole or controlling shareholder, should the issues first be
reported or approved by the relevant department of the local people’s government.
See id. arts. 16, 24, 34, 40, 53 (transfer of state assets that would result in losing
control). With respect to decision in other state-invested enterprises, prior
government approval may be required when relevant provisions exist in other laws
and regulations. Id. art 35. For political-economic reins on the state’s capacity as a
shareholder, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 6.
96
For examples, see discussion infra notes 97-100. There are of course
situations in which a state controlling shareholder will act as a profit maximizing
investor. The state as an economically oriented investor is expected to be a
relatively passive investor (such as in its sovereign wealth fund capacity e.g., the
China’s National Social Security Fund, China Investment Corporation, and other
state-owned capital investment enterprises).
97
These examples include the use of controlled firms for geopolitical goals as
part of the One Belt One Road Initiative. Many of these projects are criticized for
being economically senseless but nevertheless pass corporate governance
approvals (even in private firms). See Jenni March, The Rise and Fall of a Belt and
Road
Billionaire,
CNN
(Dec.
2018),
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/asia/patrick-ho-ye-jianming-cefctrial-intl/ [https://perma.cc/U96S-EP9J]; Wendy Wu, How the Communist Party
controls China’s state-owned industrial titans, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 17, 2017,
10:01 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2098755/howcommunist-party-controls-chinas-state-owned-industrial-titans
[https://perma.cc/3L4P-MYPF].
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management to accelerate market reforms,98 or to influence or even
control market volatility; 99 and using state-controlled firms to
advance broad social goals or to carry ad-hoc social tasks, as seen
recently when firms were mobilized to shift production lines to
combat the spread of COVID-19.100
Prioritizing state interests is easier when the state’s holding ratio
in the firm is higher. Yet notably, private firms can still be enlisted
or at least pressured to contribute to national goals in a similar
manner even with minority or no state ownership. 101 The SOE
98
Michael Firth, Chen Lin & Hong Zou, Friend or Foe? The Role of State and
Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China, 45 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 685, 692, 699–704 (2010) (reflecting that managers of listed
SOEs easily passed generous compensations to investors as part of a structural
reform in the capital market, even when such decisions were against the economic
interest of the firm, due to pressures to implement the reform quickly).
99
During the 2015-2016 market downturn, buy-sale orders of state-controlled
insurance firms and financial institutions were directed by the Party-state to control
market volatility. Gabriel Wildau, China’s ‘National Team’ Owns 6 Percent of Stock
Market, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7515f06c-939d11e5-9e3e-eb48769cecab [https://perma.cc/2A9X-G6NA].
Ad-hoc trade
suspensions to control supply and demand and stabilize the market where traders
are called to heed “political consciousness” amidst important political events were
reported as well. See Shen Hong & Stella Yifan Xie, That Calm Chinese Stock Market?
It’s
Engineered
by
the
State,
WALL ST. J.
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/that-calm-chinese-stock-market-its-engineeredby-the-government-1527775089 [https://perma.cc/5CFL-LNU3].
100
Amidst Covid-19, companies were recruited to national mask-making
effort regardless of their ordinary business lines. See, for example, the recruiting of
the subsidiaries of Sinopec, an oil and gas giant. Masha Borak, Chinese Factory Live
Streams Face Mask Material Production Amid Coronavirus Shortages, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/abacus/newsbites/article/3074232/chinese-factory-live-streams-face-mask-materialproduction-amid [https://perma.cc/XB4Z-N7CH].
There are numerous
additional instances whereby state-controlled firms were called upon to assist the
government in a broad array of social tasks, from the Beijing Olympic Games and
the Shanghai World Expo, to providing assistance following natural disasters. See
Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-owned
Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 663 (2014) (“According to a Xinhua report,
twenty four hours after the Qinghai Yushu earthquake hit on April 14, 2010, China’s
big SOEs, including the state-owned airlines and airports, energy companies,
telecoms, transportation firms, medical companies, and agricultural trading
companies, were called upon by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council
(Dangzhongyang, Guowuyuan) to participate in the rescue efforts by providing
services and materials.”).
101
See, for example, in the recent Covid-19 context, Finbarr Bermingham &
Su-Lin Tan, Coronavirus: China ramps up mask production, and reminds world it is
manufacturing
king,
INKSTONE
NEWS
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://www.inkstonenews.com/business/coronavirus-china-ramps-maskproduction-and-reminds-world-it-manufacturing-king/article/3074900
[ https://perma.cc/DC6K-9T57].
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Assets Law legally prescribes national and social responsibility
obligations for any state-invested enterprise, and the PRC Company
Law does the same for all companies.102 Indeed, a survey of the top
500 private enterprises (biggest enterprises by annual operating
income) shows that 94.2 percent of such enterprises participated in
various national development schemes during 2019.103
The analysis above should not imply any normative claim
against state ownership in and of itself, nor against state corporate
control in China. It can certainly be the case that state corporate
control has benefited the Chinese economy, its market development,
and Chinese society at large. Rather, the point here is that corporate
organization in China introduced challenges that are particularly
alarming for investors in Chinese publicly listed firms (domestic and
foreign alike).
The ownership and control structures that characterize many of
these firms combine the agency costs of dispersed ownership with
the perils of unmonitored corporate controllers whose interests may
or may not align with those of public investors in individual firms.
Firms can be more easily harnessed in pursuit of national and
political goals, as well as for the personal interests of corporate
insiders. Investors in Chinese listed firms seem to be open for
exploitation on all fronts.
b. Protections Offered by Conventional Corporate Governance
According to conventional wisdom, a robust corporate
governance system should be able to remedy many of the structural
predicaments reviewed above. It is, therefore, generally asserted
that corporate governance should mainly revolve around
mechanisms that would prevent the exploitation of investors by
those who control their investment, or, in positive terms, on the
102
SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 17 (“accept the supervision of the
general public, assume social responsibilities, and be responsible to the contributor
[i.e., the state]”); 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 5 (“When conducting
business operations, a company shall comply with . . . social morality . . . accept the
supervision of the government and general public and bear social
responsibilities.”).
103 Ministry Econ. Affs., 2020 Zhongguo Minying Qiye 500 qiang Fabu Baogao
[2020 中国民营企业 500 强发布报告] (China Top 500 Private Enterprises Released
Report),
ALL-CHINA
FED’N
INDUS.
&
COM
(Sept.
10,
2020),
http://www.acfic.org.cn/zzjg_327/nsjg/jjb/jjbgzhdzt/2020my5bq/2020my5bq_
bgbd/202009/t20200904_244200.html [https://perma.cc/QSN9-4J8H].
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ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations are assured of
getting a return on their investment. If investors’ expectations for a
fair game are met, the theory goes, they will be reassured and
encouraged to continue investing. This will keep the cost of
financing sufficiently low and will promote a vibrant capital market
with minimal monitoring costs on part of public investors.
It follows that potential exploitative behavior by corporate
control parties (insider management and controlling shareholders)
can be minimized by an array of monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms gathered under the umbrella of a system’s corporate
governance regime. The Anglo-American corporate governance
system is commonly viewed as the optimal system for the task and
its mechanisms were embraced into the corporate laws of many
countries around the world.
Outwardly, Chinese listed firms appear as many other public
corporations, embracing conventional corporate governance
mechanisms, many of which are modeled after Anglo-American
counterparts.
Boards, independent directors, audit (and
supervisory) committees, and fiduciary duties infused with
shareholder standing rights, are featured in China’s Company Law.
Furthermore, a review of the full legal framework portrays that
China’s policymakers had opted for an empowering, shareholderoriented corporate governance. Judged solely based on its blackletter law, contemporary China offers one of the most robust
shareholder-empowering corporate statutes in the world. 104
Chinese law thus grants shareholders rights that go far beyond the
powers conferred on shareholders in many other systems, even

104
For the shareholders’ assembly extensive list of powers, see 2005 Company
Law, supra note 61, arts. 37, 98, 99: (1) to determine the company’s operating
guidelines and investment plans; (2) to elect and replace directors and supervisors
(except for the representatives of the employees) and to decide their remuneration;
(3) to approve reports of the board of directors; (4) to approve reports of the
supervisory board; (5) to approve annual ﬁnancial budget plans and accounts; (6)
to approve plans for proﬁt distribution and loss recovery; (7) to decide on changes
to the registered capital; (8) to approve the issuance of corporate bonds; (9) to adopt
resolutions on a corporate merger, division, change in the company’s form,
dissolution or liquidation; (10) to amend the bylaws; and (11) to exercise other
powers provided for in the bylaws. Other “important matters” might also require
a decision by the shareholders (e.g., “to transfer or accept any significant assets”);
and even a decision on the issuance of new shares which is commonly reserved to
the board of directors in other corporate regimes. Id. art. 104, art. 124, art. 150. A
fuller account is available in Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 45-48.
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under American corporate laws, the hub of shareholder-primacy
notions.105
As I discuss elsewhere, however, this facially shareholderempowering regulatory framework does little to empower public
investors or restrict the behavior of corporate control parties against
them. Quite the contrary, the shareholder-empowering approach
taken in China serves in actuality only to further the Party-state as
the controlling shareholder.106
Furthermore, whatever public shareholder rights are on offer,
other structural impediments—grounded in China’s political
economy—cast a large shadow of doubt as to the ability of public
shareholders to secure these rights and have recourse to their losses
through legal enforcement.
The infirmities of conventional corporate governance
institutions in China have been addressed extensively in the
literature.107 The resulted situation has been described as “a ready
invitation to opportunism, ‘tunneling,’ minority shareholder
exploitation and oppression.”108
A full account of conventional corporate governance
mechanisms and their operation in China is outside the scope of this
Article.109 Here, I will briefly review the status of public and private
enforcement bodies, while presenting the predicaments that
105
For example, in the United States, under the Model Business Corporation
Act and Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) all corporate powers are
vested with the board of directors, whose discretion has been further expanded by
the courts. There are only a handful of matters that require shareholders’ approval:
amendments to the corporate charter (as opposed to bylaws, which can be amended
by the board of directors), and mergers, consolidation, or a sale of all or
substantially all assets. Shareholders may convene a special shareholders’ meeting
only if the company’s bylaw permits them to do so, and a shareholder proposal is
generally nonbinding. See Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. § 101-398.
See generally Model Bus. Corp. Act (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002).
106
See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78.
107
See generally Chao Xi, Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and
Practice, 17 INT’ L CO. & COM. L. REV. 251, 258-262 (2006) (examining the factors that
may have deterred Chinese institutional investors from exerting a greater voice in
corporate governance); Clarke, supra note 69; Clarke, supra note 67; Howson &
Clarke, supra note 69; Groswald Ozery, supra note 78; and Donald Clarke, How
China’s Effort to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE
CAPITALISM (Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2016); Howson, supra note
87.
108
Howson, supra note 87, at 6.
109
A full review of external and internal conventional corporate governance
mechanisms is available in Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 6.
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rendered legal enforcing institutions in China powerless against
strong, often Party-state related, corporate insiders, and controllers.
i.

Public Enforcement—The CSRC

The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the
central government agency responsible for protecting the interests
of investors in China. Unlike the securities regulator in the United
States (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC), the
CSRC has stepped into aspects of internal governance that are
traditionally reserved within corporate laws. The CSRC, for
example, is responsible for the promulgation of China’s Code for
Corporate Governance, 110 as well as for a number of mandatory
regulations that establish investors’ rights beyond what is only
enabled in the primary Company and Securities Laws (enacted by
the Chinese legislator, the National People’s Congress).111
For instance, even before the inclusion of a (loose) independent
directors provision in the Company Law, the CSRC issued the
Guidance for Independent Directors, which required listed firms to
amend their bylaws and appoint independent directors to their
boards. 112 Around the same time, it enacted rules that were
designed to make the decision-making process with respect to the
sale, exchange, or purchase of major assets independent from the
controlling shareholders of the firm.113 Perhaps most reflective of
110
Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [上市公司治理准则] (Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies) (first promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory
Comm’n and the State Economic and Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2001, Rev’d Sep. 30,
2018),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201904/P0
20190415336431477120.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7R7-GDS4].
111
See generally Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” As
Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s
Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic
Power, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 667 (2014) (examining why was the CSRC allowed this
position).
112
Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors
of Listed Companies, (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Aug.
16,
2001),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_691
91.html [https://perma.cc/NH24-KG6L].
113
Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shangshi
Gongsi Zhongda Goumai, Chushou, Zhihuan Zichan Ruogan Wenti de Tongzhi [
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the CSRC’s investor protection orientation are the CSRC 2004
Provisions, which encouraged minority shareholders’ participation in
governance through a public-shareholders’ negative veto on certain
corporate decisions.114
Beyond introducing investor protection norms, the CSRC has
been particularly active in developing market monitoring
mechanisms that allow it to detect securities market fraud and halt
off any suspicious trading activity in real-time. These “penetrative
supervision” prevention efforts are said to create a “giant network
of (market) surveillance” facilitated to protect investors.115
These “regulatory activism” actions by the CSRC are but few
examples of how China’s capital markets regulator is increasingly
intent on responding to broad investors’ expectations in order to
encourage the flow of capital to the market.116
Still, granting protections and guaranteeing protections are two
separate things. While the CSRC was allowed leeway for regulatory
action, its power to enforce its policies has been curtailed to a large
degree. 117 Many CSRC rules did not set forth any enforcing

中国证券监督管理委员会关于上市公司重大购买、出售、置换资产若干问题的通知]
(Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Several Issues
Concerning Major Purchases, Sales and Exchanges of Assets by Listed Companies)
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Oct. 12, 2001, effective Jan. 1,
2002),
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=38021&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/C5R3-JB6H].
114
See Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohu de
Ruogan Guiding [关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定] (Provisions on
Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public
Shareholders) (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 7, 2004), art.
1.1.(5),
[hereinafter
CSRC
2004
Provisions]
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3830&CGid=
[https://perma.cc/B2XD-JTP6]. See e.g., arts. 1(1)(a)–(d) (referring to approval by
the “general public shareholders group” (“shehui gongzhonggu gudong”) which is
understood to mean holders of publicly-listed shares not affiliated with the
controlling parties).
115
Hong and Xie, supra note 99.
116
Examples of regulatory activism by the CSRC are numerous. For details
on regulatory action by the CSRC, including its 2007 three-year campaign that
examined the implementation of corporate governance norms in Chinese listed
firms, see OECD, China Country Study: Self-Assessment Against The OECD Principles
of
Corporate
Governance
(2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZJR26QF].
117
See Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao & Oliver M. Rui, Is
China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement
Actions, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2005).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

958

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

mechanisms and left remedial measures to be set by primary laws.118
Without administrative sanctions and remedies for violations of
these rules, CSRC enforcement was largely discretionary. In that
endeavor, the CSRC had to navigate the myriad of tensions and
power conflicts within China’s political economy.
Public enforcement by the CSRC, particularly against insiders
and other controlling parties in state-controlled firms, is not
welcomed by powerful Party-state organs and is often held back.119
Publicly listed state-controlled enterprises enjoy more lenient
enforcement of facially uniform legal standards.120 The CSRC, like
other state agencies, is more likely to enforce laws, regulations, or
policies (or enforce them more rigorously) against violators that are
unaffiliated with the Party-state apparatus than against those that
are affiliated, even in clear cases of oppression or fraud.121
In sum, while the norms and mandatory provisions of the CSRC
sometimes result in the empowerment of public shareholders to
receive fairer treatment, their contribution to investors depends on
the relative power of the CSRC within the political system at any
given time. 122
The position of the CSRC within China’s
administrative and political hierarchy seems to have weakened
since the 2015–2016 market crash. Subsequent legal enforcement
and Party disciplinary procedures against senior CSRC officials
have discredited the agency and potentially wounded its authority

118
The 1993 Company Law, which was in force when many of the CSRC rules
were enacted, only addressed declaratory remedies or cease and desist orders for
violations of shareholders rights. See 1993 Company Law, supra note 61, arts. 111,
150. The recent revision of the PRC Securities Law (effective March 2020) expanded
on the legal liability and remedial measures, supra note 15, Chapter 13.
119
But see Huang (Robin) Hui, Enforcement of Chinese Insider Trading Law: An
Empirical and Comparative Perspective (January 30, 2019), The Chinese University of
Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2020-24. Forthcoming, Am. J. Comp.
L. (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325717 [https://perma.cc/XN65-9XAA]
(finding shift in the CSRC’s enforcement power against insider trading towards
greater enforcement since 2008).
120
Henk Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Political Connections and
Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China,
45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1391, 1393 (2010); William T. Allen & Han Shen,
Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets (January 2011), Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research., Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16713.
121
Berkman, Cole & Lawrence, supra note 120. For a case example, see the
CSRC’s enforcement procedures against Nanjing Textile Import Export Corp., Ltd.
in Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 21-22.
122
See, e.g., Huang, supra note 119, at 5 (noting that the CSRC’s ability to
enforce “will depend largely on the local political economy conditions”).
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within China’s political economy.123 In some respects, the CSRC’s
void, along with the void of other state institutions, in ensuring
effective capital market governance, makes way for more direct
involvement by party institutions.124
It remains to be seen if the March 2020 amendment of the PRC
Securities law, which added clarity and force to the administrative
sanctions and remedies the CSRC is authorized to take, would
change this political-economy dynamic.
ii.

Private Enforcement—The People’s Courts System

I have reviewed above the main challenges for administrative
enforcement by the CSRC in response to securities laws violations
in Chinese listed firms. As in other legal systems, the route for
private enforcement by injured investors (or by the firm) in response
to corporate malfeasance by managers and other corporate
controllers passes through the courts’ system. Despite many
positive developments, China’s People’s Court system, similar to
the CSRC, still suffers institutional impediments that curtail its
ability to enforce effectively and protect the interests of public
investors against powerful insiders.
The approach to private securities litigation in China has not
been particularly welcoming. As in many other systems around the
world, an American-style securities law class action was not
123
The chairman of the CSRC, Xiao Gang, was removed from his position
following the crises. See China Removes Xiao as CSRC Head After Stock Market
Meltdown,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Feb.
19,
2016,
7:47
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/head-of-china-ssecurities-regulator-to-step-down-wsj-reports [https://perma.cc/6ACF-GAQW].
Additionally, Yao Gang, vice chairman of the CSRC, as well as Zhang Yujun,
assistant chairman, were investigated through the CCP’s disciplinary proceedings.
See, e.g., Zhongyang Jiwei Jiancha Bu [中央纪委监察部] (Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection), Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Dangwei
Weiyuan, Fu Zhuxi Yao Gang Shexian Yanzhong Weiji Jieshou Zuzhi Diaocha [中
国证券监督管理委员会党委委员、副主席姚刚涉嫌严重违纪接受组织调查]
(Investigation of Yao Gang, Member of the Party Committee and Deputy Chairman
of CSRC, under Suspicion of Serious Disciplinary Violations) (Nov. 13, 2015),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jlsc/zggb/jlsc_zggb/201607/t20160704_83027.html
[https://perma.cc/G59E-FNXL].
124 See generally Groswald Ozery, supra note 76 (referring specifically to Part V
on the recent shift in the political economic equilibrium within the Party-state
system). More generally on the consolidation of control over the state sector during
Xi Jinping’s rule, see Wendy Leutert, Firm Control: Governing the State-owned
Economy under Xi Jinping, CHINA PERSP. 2018 1-2, 27 (2018).
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permitted.125 Instead, a private right of action based on a securities
law claim can take the form of either an individual action or a joint
action.126 The latter was available for claims in which the number of
plaintiffs is fixed at the time of filing or when the court decides to
adjudicate several individual suits together for particular reasons.127
The 2020 Securities Law amendment has enacted a provision for a
“representative action”128 which commentators view as a new path
for shareholders class-action.129
Individual actions also do not have a free pass to courts. In the
early 2000s, from a complete rejection of private litigation claims
based on securities law, courts moved to accept some claims, under
substantive and procedural limitations. 130 Primary among these
limitations is the narrow scope of underlying claims accepted, which
is de-facto limited to misrepresentation-based claims,131 as well as a
125
Hui (Robin) Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A TenYear Retrospective and Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757 (2013).
126 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia
Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding [最高人民法院关于
审理证 券市 场因 虚 假陈 述 引 发的 民事赔 偿案 件的 若 干规 定] (Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court Concerning the Acceptance and Trial of Civil
Compensation Securities Suits Involving Misrepresentation) (effective Feb. 1, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 SPC Circular] (incorporating article 54 of the PRC Civil Procedure
Law and, by implication, rejecting article 55 of the same law which governs class
actions).
127
For a detailed analysis of the developments of China’s joint action
mechanism and the differences with a more recognized (U.S.-style) class action, see
Huang, supra note 125.
128
PRC Securities Law, supra note 15, art. 95; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu
Zhengquan Jiufen Daibiaoren Susong Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [最高人民法院关
于证券纠纷代表人诉讼若干问题的规定] (Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court
on Several Issues Concerning Representative Actions Arising from Securities
Disputes), issued by the Supreme People’s Court, July 30, 2020,
[https://perma.cc/F3J9-JLQZ].
129
China Launches Class-action Lawsuit System for its 167 Million Securities
Investors,
CLYDE
&
CO.,
Aug
13,
2020,
https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2020/08/china-launches-class-actionlawsuit-system-for-its [https://perma.cc/4P3Q-NKYX]; Samuel Shen & Alun John,
China Govt-backed Class Actions Take Aim at Corporate Fraud – with Limits, REUTERS,
Aug
18,
2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-regulationclassaction/china-govt-backed-class-actions-take-aim-at-corporate-fraud-withlimits-idUKKCN25F05U?edition-redirect=uk [https://perma.cc/9GK5-N65R].
130
For more information on the relevant Supreme People’s Court circulars
and background on private securities litigation in China, see Huang, supra note 125,
at 760-761.
131
Although the Securities Law acknowledges the compensation liability of
an inside trader and of traders who conducted market manipulation (when it
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requirement that a claim will be heard only following an adverse
finding in public enforcement procedures (administrative penalty or
a criminal procedure).132
A joint opinion by the Supreme People’s Court and CSRC on
matters related to disputes in securities, 133 as well as subsequent
provincial courts’ opinions, reflects that the People’s Courts system
is intent on pushing securities claims away from courts into

resulted in losses for investors), it has not yet provided the legal basis for private
civil litigation based on such claims. Therefore, investors injured by such actions
are left to rely on general tort or contract law claims. See Nicholas Calcina Howson,
Punishing Possession—China’s All-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 327, 341-342 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed.,
2013).
132
For a review of additional procedural hurdles embedded in the 2003 SPC
Circular, see Guiping Lu, Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud Law in China: A
Critique of the Supreme People’s Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities
Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 781 (2003) (elaborating on procedural provisions
regarding standing, jurisdiction, and other prerequisites which the author argues
make private action based on securities law “very hard”).
133
Zuigao renmin fayuan zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui
guanyu quanmian tuijin zhengquan qihuo jiufen duoyuan huajie jizhi jianshe de
yijian [最高人民法院 中国证券监督管理委员会 关于全面推进证券期货纠纷多元化解
机制建设的意见] (Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the
Supreme People’s Court on Accelerating the Construction of Diverse Mechanisms
for Securities and Futures’ Disputes) (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court
and the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, July 13, 2016), art. 13 [hereinafter SPC &
CSRC
Joint
Opinions],
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201811/t20181130_34750
5.html [https://perma.cc/6H4L-WZFT] (“For civil disputes arising from illegal
acts such as false statements, insider trading, and manipulation of the market, the
people’s courts need to declare legal rules through judicial decisions . . . .”).
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alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 134 A path that was
subsequently enshrined in a recent revision of the Securities Law.135
With respect to a private right of action based on governance
claims established in the PRC Company Law, the 2005 Company
Law took an important step to protect the rights of shareholders
with judicial remedies. These included the enactment of several
liability provisions and shareholder access to courts:
the
accountability of shareholders that abused the interests of the
company or other shareholders, with compensation set as a remedy
for the company and other shareholders’ losses;136 access to a type
of appraisal by the court in certain cases where shareholders are
bought out by the company;137 an option to ask the court to revoke
certain decisions for legal and procedural violations; 138 standing
rights against directors and managers for violations that have

134
SPC & CSRC Joint Opinions, supra note 133. The Shanghai Financial Court
was apparently the first to formally develop an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism for securities law disputes, which received the title “Model Judgment
Mechanism.” The Beijing Higher People’s Court followed recently with a similar
model on a trial basis. Under this mechanism, a securities law dispute (practically
limited to misrepresentation claims) may be selected as “a model case” for other
“parallel” cases belonging to the same group securities disputes, to be deliberated
in principle in mediation, based on the model case’s fact-finding process and legal
analysis. The first application for approval of a model case was submitted March
21, 2019. See Shanghai Jinrong Fayuan guanyu Zhengquan Jiufen Shifan Panjue
Jizhi de Guiding [上海金融法院关于证券纠纷示范判决机制的规定] (Regulations of
the Shanghai Financial Court on the Model Judgment Mechanism for Securities
Disputes),
January
16,
2019
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/lM6Y7VOG9YiOlPEYZHLMhQ
[https://perma.cc/N3GV-RFHM]; Beijingshi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan guanyu Yifa
Gongzheng Gaoxiao Chuli Quntixing Zhengquan Jiufen de Yijian (Shixing) [北京市
高级人民法院关于依法公正高效处理群体性证券纠纷的意见（试行）] (Beijing
Higher People’s Court trial Opinions on the Fair and Efficient Handling of Group
Securities Disputes According to Law) (for trial implementation) [Jinggao Fafa,
2019,
No.
243],
April
30,
2019
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/P7_NNPhA2HukvpBf60Kogw
[https://perma.cc/6GWG-6QVK].
135
PRC Securities law, supra note 15, arts. 93, 94.
136
2005 Company Law, supra note 61, Arts. 20, 21 (determining similar liability
and requiring compensation from corporate controllers and insiders who have
injured the interests of the company by taking advantage of their affiliations).
137
Note, however, appraisal through access to court is specified only in the
case of limited liability companies, while for listed companies the law does not
specifically mention courts proceedings. Id. Compare art. 74, which applies to
LLCs, with art. 142(4), which applies to listed companies.
138 Id. art. 22.
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injured shareholders; 139 and finally, the ability to file a derivative
suit on behalf of the company.140
Shielding the rights of public shareholders with liability
provisions and access to courts are of course significant and vital
steps in any system that aims to protect investors, but it can hardly
ensure implementation. The first impediment to overcome in
applying the remedies formally granted to shareholders is the
absence of a body that can act on behalf of retail dispersed investors
as a group. Institutional investors in China are captured within a
network of state ownership and control, and other coalitionbuilding efforts that could potentially overcome a collective action
problem are restricted.141 The recent revision of the Securities law
enabled such coalition-building through a government-backed
“investor protection institution,” 142 but it remains to be seen how
such an institution would operate and will it be allowed to act
independently.
Another serious barrier that limits the formally granted access to
courts are institutional impediments within the judicial system
itself. Three main impediments are frequently mentioned in the
literature: the professional, even if improving, qualifications of
judges to adjudicate complex commercial and business law
matters; 143 the courts’ relative position within the administrative
hierarchy, general social distrust in the courts’ system, and the
limited role historically reserved to courts as a legal institution, all
limiting its autonomy; and finally, the court system’s capture within
the existing political economy, which leads to its complete lack of
political independence.144
Id. art. 152.
Id. art. 149, 151.
141 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 41-44.
142
PRC Securities law, supra note 15, arts. 90, 93-95; see also Groswald Ozery,
supra note 78, at 42-44 (contemplating the prospect of such government-sanctioned
institution prior to its recognition in the Securities law amendment).
143
See Weixia Gu, The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo
Vadis Chinese Courts?, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 303 (2013) (providing a comprehensive
review of the state of affairs of the judiciary in China).
144
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports “over sixtyeight percent of surveyed judges identified local protectionism as a major cause of
unfairness in judicial decisions.” CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE PRC, https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-theprc [https://perma.cc/W78H-9LQ3] (last visited May 25, 2019); see also Yuhua
Wang, Court Funding and Judicial Corruption in China, 69 CHINA J. 43 (2013)
(examining the setting and practice of courts’ funding and their perceived judicial
139
140
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Such impediments are felt particularly when controversial cases
arise. These are cases that pose potential threats to the legitimacy of
the Party-state system or to social stability, based not only on their
substantive matter but also on the identity of the litigants. Cases in
which investors’ claims are against state-controlled companies and
affiliated defendants, claims potentially pertaining to a large
number of litigants, or simply those that reflect badly on either the
Party or the state (central or local governments) are often pushed
away by the courts.145
A non-independent court system embedded within the Partystate bureaucracy cannot work to check and balance the power of
corporate control parties over public shareholders. Given that the
court system is formally and functionally a branch of government
enmeshed within the broader hierarchical network, it has even a
greater impartiality challenge when the control parties are at an
equal or higher position within the Party-state hierarchy—exactly
the occasions where checks and balances on abuse of power are most
needed.
There have been efforts in the past few years to reform the
People’s Court system.146 The institutional structure was changed
so as to centralize the management and funding of local courts at the
level of the provincial governments (rather than by lower-tier local
authorities) and to create cross-jurisdictional courts. 147 Yet, these
efforts focus on centralizing control over the judicial system, not
reducing it. The reforms focus on increasing professionalism and
curbing local protectionism. Most of the changes are aimed to curb
courts’ dependence on immediate local governments. 148 These
efforts may result in more autonomy in some lower-level cases, but
corruption); Nicholas Calcina Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts,
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. ASIA L. REV.
303, 327-329 (2010) (discussing cases from the Shanghai People’s Courts reflecting
more, and less, autonomy); Gu, supra note 143, at 313.
145
See Clarke & Howson, supra note 69, at 247. But see Hui Huang, Shareholder
Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 27
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 619, 648-653 (2012) (critiquing arguments about political
barrier and suggesting instead economic rationales as explanations for the limited
number of derivative lawsuits).
146
See China Issues White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, CHINA
DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201702/27/content_28361584_3.htm [https://perma.cc/FZH7-APVV] (last updated
Feb. 27, 2017).
147
See Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, 20 ASIA POL’Y 4, 7 (2015).
148
See, e.g., Yueduan Wang, “Detaching” Courts from Local Politics? Assessing
the Judicial Centralization Reforms in China, 2020 CHINA QUARTERLY 1, 2.
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nothing in these efforts aims to increase the independence of the
court system from the Party-state apparatus more generally, nor to
strengthen the autonomy of the court system as an institution.
c. Implications for the United States and Other Foreign Investors
Resulting from the picture above, both public and private
enforcement mechanisms are therefore unable to guarantee the
interests of public investors against China’s corporate controlling
apparatus, be it against the interests of China’s national champion
listed entities and their insiders and controllers, the local
governments as shareholders and their appointees, or even
politically entrenched private actors. This reality perpetuates a
situation whereby China’s conventional corporate governance
system is unable to restrain corporate control parties ex-ante nor to
hold them accountable ex-post.149
The relevance of such a reality for foreign investors that are
invested directly in China’s capital market is clear. Perhaps less
straightforward is the impact on foreign investors when they invest
in Chinese companies that are listed, and even domiciled, outside of
China—as is indeed the case for most offshore-listed Chinese
firms.150
When a Chinese firm issued shares in an offshore market,
investors in the issuer are exposed to the impediments discussed
above through their dependence on the operating Chinese entities
and their insiders. Any excess opportunities for self-dealing,
tunneling, and corruption in China (whether by the insiders and
controlling shareholders of the operating firm or by the officials
involved in supervising and regulating their activity)151 spill over to
harming foreign investors outside China. Likewise, any concern for
“expropriation” through the state’s interference with the firms’
decision making in favor of national (or other) priorities,152 would
apply to the Chinese operating entity and might therefore impact
the operations and the economic results of the offshore issuer,
affecting investors’ interests.
See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 19.
With respect to China-based U.S. issuers, see Moon, supra note 40. With
respect to Chinese firms listed for trade in Hong Kong, supra note 33.
151
See supra Part III.A.1.
152
See supra Part III.A.2.
149

150
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While the embedded risks apply also to foreign investors in
China-based offshore issuers, the limited remedies enshrined in
China’s conventional framework of corporate governance, do not.
These remedies are subject to limitations of firm domicile and
jurisdiction. 153 Whichever rights and protections are granted to
investors in Chinese issuers by application of China’s Company and
Securities laws, such rights and protections are beyond the reach of
foreign investors in most offshore listed China-based firms.154
On top of these market inherent hurdles, foreign investors in
China-based offshore issuers experience some unique concerns as
well. These unique concerns emanate from the organizational
structures commonly used to facilitate the offshore listings of Chinabased firms,155 the inadequacy of legal arrangements that regulate
the activity of foreign issuers in their host country, 156 as well as
China’s own policies and conducts with respect to cooperation with
foreign authorities. These specific concerns have been brought to
the fore by U.S. regulators in recent years157 and will be discussed
further in Part V in the context of recent U.S. policy shifts.
153
Articles 2 and 10 of the 2005 Company law, supra note 61 (setting the
applicability of the Company law on companies established in the PRC territory
with the main registered office as the firm’s domicile); Article 78, supra note 61
(requiring that at least fifty percent of the founders of a joint stock company are
domiciled in China); and Article 2 of the PRC Securities law, supra note 15 (setting
the applicability of the securities law on issuers and traders in the PRC); Article 2
of the Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110 (setting the applicability of the
code on companies incorporated following the PRC Company law whose stocks are
listed and traded on PRC stock exchanges).
154
Note that the March 2020 amendment to the PRC Securities Law
potentially expands the applicability of accountability provisions under the law on
security issuances and trading activity outside China when such activity disrupted
China’s internal market order and damaged the rights and interests of China’s
domestic investors (thus expanding protections under the law to Chinese investors
in firms listed offshore). Supra note 15, art. 2.
155
As risks analysts and Chinese law practitioners often note, the legality of
the VIE structure that is often used to facilitate offshore listing is questionable.
Which PRC laws will apply and how will they apply on offshore listed China-based
firms is, therefore, still an open question. Supra notes 42-43 (noting the structure
and unique risks embedded in VIEs); supra notes 45-46 (noting the structure and
unique risks in reverse merger firms); as well as the discussion in Part V infra.
156
See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403,
1444-49 (2020) (pointing to host jurisdictions that erected procedural hurdles to
pursue derivative lawsuits).
157
See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE:
TOPIC NO.10, (2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/disclosure-considerationschina-based-issuers [https://perma.cc/SLG5-V9UA] (noting a variety of specific
risks for U.S. investors in China-based issuers).
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The implications for foreign investors are particularly alarming
if one considers the limited ability of host countries (United States
or other) to enforce their own laws and execute judgments over
China-based offshore listed firms and their insiders.158
IV.

ALTERNATIVES WITHIN ILLIBERAL GOVERNANCE159

So far, the Article discussed the growing integration of Chinese
listed firms with global financial markets through their access to
public finance. Given the challenges of corporate organization in
China which created ample opportunities for shareholder abuse,
and in the absence of robust legal protections for public investors in
Chinese firms (both in and outside China), what explains the
puzzling allure of these firms and their ability to attract external
finance at home and abroad? What works in the system to balanceoff such risks and explains investors’ confidence?
This Article finds answers in China’s illiberal corporate
governance mechanisms.
Alongside its many obstructions, China’s illiberal governance
utilizes alternative mechanisms—at both the state and Party
capacities—to ensure market regularity.
In the corporate
governance context, specifically, these alternative governance
mechanisms boost market stability and discipline corporate
insiders. Through both carrots and sticks, such an alternative
framework supports market growth and reassures investors that
their reasonable expectations for returns will be met.160
Attributes of illiberal corporate governance are thus responsible
for many of the ailments surrounding investments in Chinese firms,
but at the same time hold the key to understanding the market’s
unprecedented success and its allure to investors.

158
Fried & Kamar, supra note 44 (arguing that PRC laws insulate the insiders
of China-based U.S. issuers from legal accountability and remedies based in U.S.
laws).
159
The following discussion does not include all the mechanisms through
which greater market regularity is promoted by state and/or Party institutions.
Many more mechanisms are deployed as part of China’s illiberal governance but
cannot be covered here (e.g., a corporate social credit system, China’s cadre
evaluation and promotion system and its market impact).
160
As Clarke aptly notes, “It is perception, which determines whether persons
are willing to invest and make deals, that counts . . . .” Clarke, supra note 60, at 91.
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a. Carrots of State Capacity
State ownership is generally considered less efficient even while
the precise effects of state ownership on the performance of Chinese
listed firms are ambiguous.161 Notwithstanding, state capacities can
support the growth of Chinese firms and lure investments in
additional ways.
Numerous studies in the political science literature and
development economics explore China’s economic growth and
address the role of the state in supporting economic development.
Some of the arguments expressed in these studies can explain the
puzzle of external finance in public firms as well. The aspects of
state support that received the most scholarly attention are
“developmental-state” style policies, which include granting certain
firms preferred access to credit, tax incentives, subsidies, priority in
infrastructure projects, and other forms of economic assistance from
the Chinese government (central and local authorities).
Implicit and explicit state guarantees for the debts of financial
institutions and large firms are known to have prevented financial
stress, add stability, and shield certain firms from default risks.162
Studies show that these forms of state support mainly favored statecontrolled companies and large politically connected private firms
and discriminated against small-medium enterprises and the
private sector more generally.163

161
Some studies suggest that the effect on performance depends on the level
of state ownership. Others argue that the effect depends on which administrative
level of the state holds the shares and how far away is the state in the ownership
chain. See, for example, the studies covered in Clarke, supra note 69, at 139-143.
162
But see LOGAN WRIGHT, LAUREN GLOUDEMAN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, THE
CHINA ECONOMIC RISK MATRIX 32-38 (Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, 2020) (opining
that the state’s capacity to manage financial stress is changing).
163
See Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian & Meijun Qian, A Review of China’s
Institutions, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 39, 39-64 (2019) (and the sources therein);
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China,
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 59 (2005) (noting that other “corporate governance mechanisms,
such as those based on reputation and relationships . . . support the growth of the
private sector”); Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 6 (attributing the success of large
Chinese firms, regardless of ownership, to their ability to foster relationships and
connections to the government). See generally YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008) (comparing
economic growth in Shanghai, a state-led municipality, and Zhejiang province,
where entrepreneurship was allowed to thrive, and lamenting the economic effects
of private sector discrimination).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1

2021] Illiberal Governance and the Rise of China's Public Firms

969

Other forms of state macro-economic controls help in triggering
initial demands in the capital market164 and artificially affect supply
and demand thereafter. 165
These forms of state support, combined with the state’s
shareholding capacity, help prop up certain firms, give them
advantages at market entry or exit points, and support their
expansion (including into global markets). 166 The effect of
preferential state support on IPO approvals has been specifically
observed.167 Interestingly, investors were found to value political
connections in the IPO process.168
The support of the state can certainly explain how preferred
firms were shielded from financial distress or economic crises and
164
For example, the IPO Quota system substituted for market forces during
early development stages. See Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 5. China’s
IPO fixed pricing system is an additional artificial mechanism to raise demand. See
Qian et. al, supra note 16. QFII quota limit the allotted supply for foreign investors,
which presumably increased demand.
165
Macro-economic measures, such as trade suspensions, are often used to
control market volatility. Notably, during the 2015-2016 market turmoil share
prices were propped up through massive, mandated purchase orders and blanket
suspensions of trade. See Almost Half of China’s Firms Halt Trading as Market Dives,
FRANCE 24 (July 8, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.france24.com/en/20150708almost-half-chinese-firms-suspend-trading-market-dives [https://perma.cc/C3TJRFZY] (explaining that by July 8, 2015, 1,300 listed firms, representing close to fortyfive percent of the market at that time, were instructed to suspend trading to hold
back share price decrease.)
166 See ASIFMA, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD 67
(2017),
https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/china-capitalmarkets-final-english-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HAR-BJP2]; Qian Peng et
al., supra note 82, at 322-23 (showing how propping by the state helped financial
distressed firms). On forms of support by the Chinese government in economic
development more generally, see, for example, Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in
China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
297, 305-306 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003); Thomas G. Rawski, Will Investment Behavior
Constrain China’s Growth?, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 361, 370 (2002).
167
See, e.g., Joseph P. H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, Politically Connected
CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially
Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330, 331-32 (2007) (treating political connections
as a proxy for government interference in firms and examining the effect on postIPO market performance); Joseph D. Piotroski & Tianyu Zhang, Politicians and the
IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Promotions on IPO Activity in China,
111 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 120-25 (2014) (examining the effect of provincial-level
political promotions on the pace and scope of IPO activity in China); Qigui Liu,
Jinghua Tang & Gary Gang Tian, Does Political Capital Create Value in the IPO Market?
Evidence from China, 23 J. CORP. FIN. 395, 409 (2013) (finding a positive relation
between politically connected executives and the probability of IPO approval).
168 See Liu et. al, supra note 167, at 409-10 (finding that investors value political
connections, attaching a market premium to connected firms)
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how certain firms and sectors were pushed forward. Consequently,
if investors rely on such carrots of state capacity and have developed
an expectation that the Chinese government will have a hand in
promoting its firms and will effectively respond to prevent crises,
such expectations affect investors’ perception of risk.
While state support is not always guaranteed and investors
might not be able to identify the firms enjoying a preferential
treatment at all times, 169 a strong expectation that the Chinese
government will take effective stabilizing steps and will continue
supporting growth, at the market level, ensures that they remain
confident.
This is particularly relevant for foreign investors. As mentioned,
most foreign investors are invested in Chinese firms through
institutional investment vehicles and funds that track indices in
which Chinese firms are included. The broad exposure of these
investment vehicles to the Chinese market makes what happens in
an individual firm less significant than China’s market-level trends.
Some risks in capital investing in Chinese firms are thus balanced by
the state’s economic capacities in the market.
Notwithstanding, investors’ confidence cannot be based solely
on the general assumption that the state would rescue sluggish firms
and would support market growth through various interventions.170
If the gains from state support will be tunneled out from investors’
pockets to the pockets of corporate insiders in self-dealing
transactions, or if the state would freely and frequently channel
publicly-listed firms to carry its social bidding, external finance—
particularly from foreigners—will dissipate.
169
Investing alongside the state can mitigate such information asymmetry.
See Charles Calomiris et al., Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy:
Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (2010) (documenting negative
market responses to unexpected announcements on sales of government shares in
listed SOEs and conversely a positive effect following relevant policy cancellation,
arguing that the benefits of political ties outweigh efficiency costs of stateshareholdings).
170
Particularly as the Party-state seems more and more intent on finally
reducing financial institutions’ reliance on the state. See Han Wei, Baoshang Bank
Cleared to Start Bankruptcy Proceedings, CAIXIN (Nov. 24, 2020, 6:10 AM),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-11-24/baoshang-bank-cleared-to-startbankruptcy-proceedings-101631595.html [https://perma.cc/DMJ6-K7T6] (noting
that the Chinese government recently allowed, for the first time, default in a major
commercial bank). Financial institutions were seen, so far, as too important (or too
connected) to be allowed to fail. Allowing such firms to fail better aligns with
market fundamentals yet pose new risks on corporate debt which might affect
investors’ confidence. See WRIGHT ET. AL, supra note 162, at 6-9.
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Importantly, state capacity is only one foreground of illiberal
corporate governance in China that fosters investors’ confidence.
The other foreground, to which I move next, is the role of the
Chinese Communist Party in advancing market regularity.
b. Sticks of Party Presence171
Over the past decade, the Chinese Communist Party has become
uniquely invested in, and thus committed to, China’s economic
growth narrative.172 One resulted aspect of this is the Party’s strong
intent on directing economic results and advancing market
regularity by intensifying its ability to actively control the behavior
of market participants.
To facilitate this, the Party intensified its ability to directly
influence the governance of firms, separately from state ownership.
Especially since the General Secretary of the CCP and China’s
President, Xi Jinping, rose to power (2012/2013, respectively), China
opted for a complete deviation from orthodox views on how
corporations should be managed by politicizing its corporate
governance system to degrees unseen since the planned economy
era.173
Part of this change is motivated by the acute need to curb down
corruption and economic malfeasance. Corruption has become an

This section draws from Groswald Ozery, supra note 76.
See, e.g., Zachary Keck, Chinese Elites: The Real Threat to the Communist Party,
DIPLOMAT (Jan 28, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinese-elites-thereal-threat-to-the-communist-party/
[https://perma.cc/3NYQ-8WLY]
(emphasizing the challenge of rebalancing the economy while maintaining benefits
for the political elite); David Shambaugh, The Coming Chinese Crackup, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 6, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinesecrack-up-1425659198 [https://perma.cc/N669-W3K6] (pointing to China’s
economic “systemic traps” and Xi’s reform efforts as an indicator to regime
vulnerability and instability); Joshua Ball, An Economic Downturn in China is the
Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security, GLOB. SEC. REV. (May 28, 2018)
https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-dependeconomic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/VVL8-ELVE] (arguing that an economic
downturn in China is the greatest threat to Chinese domestic security); Joshua Ball,
The Chinese Communist Party’s Biggest Fears Are Separatism And An Economic Crisis,
GLOBAL SECURITY REV. (Apr 10, 2020) https://globalsecurityreview.com/threatslegitimacy-power-chinese-communist-party/ [https://perma.cc/PDM3-TQDT]
(depicting “sustained economic growth” as a new mandate of heaven).
173
Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 5-6.
171

172
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imminent threat to the regime’s stability, 174 Party unity, and
legitimacy.175 China’s crony capitalism, i.e., the overlap between its
business and political elites, 176 amplifies opportunities for
corruption and increases the volume of cases in which corrupt
conduct is exercised through, or simply involves, corporations.
The opportunity for illicit exchange between state/Party
officials and private actors is particularly abundant through
corporatized SOEs. Corporate-related corruption, particularly cases
involving corporatized SOEs, has surged in recent years and poses
a special threat to the Party-state.177 Bearing these complexities in
mind, the Party’s incentives to promote growth while directly
coming down on surging corporate corruption and related
wrongdoing becomes clear.
These circumstances suggest some degree of an alignment of
interests between the Party and corporate stakeholders, even public
investors. 178 Perhaps inadvertently, the CCP has become one of the
174 China Must Root out Corruption or Communist Party Will Be Erased from
History, Graft-Buster Warns, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 11, 2017, 12:03 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119431/chinamust-root-out-corruption-or-communist-party-will
[https://perma.cc/PKV4N79A].
175
See, for example, President Xi Jinping’s expositions stating that corruption
if not treated “will inevitably lead to the downfall of the party and the state”
(wangdang wangguo). China’s Xi Amassing Most Power since Deng Raises Reform Risk,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Dec.
30,
2013,
10:07
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-30/china-s-xi-amassingmost-power-since-deng-raises-risk-for-reform [https://perma.cc/2NJH-TL6S].
176
On the relationship between China’s private sector elite members and
Party-state officials and resulted corruption, see Keira Lu Huang, China’s GraftBusters Investigate Sinopec Chief Wang Tianpu, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 27, 2015,
9:38
PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1778090/chinas-graft-busters-investigate-sinopec-chief-wang
[https://perma.cc/JG4F-E686].
177
On the connection between corporatized SOEs and the CCP’s fight against
corruption see Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 37-45. On the surge of corporate
related corruption, see id. at n.141.
178
For example, following popular criticism against dubious investment
activity by privately held Chinese companies abroad, Xi Jinping declared financial
stability to be a matter of national security. While this can be cynically viewed as
an excuse to simply exert control over private actors, this step seems motivated, at
least partially, by a genuine concern for financial stability—thus internalizing the
need to protect public investors in highly leveraged firms that operate dubious
investments abroad and responding to mass protests against them. Minxin Pei, Xi
Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2
[https://perma.cc/E4M7-E2VN] (emphasizing political motivations but noting
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primary organs within China’s economic-power apparatus to
provide assurances to investors. It does so by deploying its own
functional substitutes for conventional corporate monitoring and
accountability, and by repeatedly signaling its commitment to
market growth.179
I have detailed elsewhere the various components and functions
of China’s recent formal shift to a “politicized corporate
governance.” 180 There, I described how political mechanisms of
corporate governance functionally substitute for both market
incentives and conventional legal monitoring and accountability
institutions and discussed implications for convergence and path
dependence theories. Here, I would like to focus particularly on
how the CCP’s corporate governance capacity, as it developed over
the past decade, increases market regularity, and thus contributes to
investors’ confidence.
The CCP’s capacity in firms no doubt has costs. At the same
time, it also increases monitoring, discipline, and accountability, and
in these ways (perhaps inadvertently) balances off some of the
investment risks discussed above.
In a way, greater CCP
involvement in corporate governance is filling a void left by a
largely dis-functional legal system and other captured state
institutions.181
The strains that greater political involvement in firms may place
on managerial discretion, risk-taking, and possibly on firm
performance are to be expected, but the positive effects on firms and

market ones as well). Relatedly, see Lucy Hornby, Chinese Crackdown on Dealmakers
Reflects
Xi
Power
Play,
FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
9,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/ed900da6-769b-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691
[https://perma.cc/UGY6-7FEW]:
The regulators’ argument that shadow banking posed a national risk
found an unlikely ally in China’s security apparatus. Ordinary people
who had lost money in high-interest products have taken to the streets in
every province over the past few years. Nothing captured the interest of
the Communist party like a mass protest.
179
See, e.g., Xi JinPing, Zai Minying Qiye Zuotanhui Shang De Jianghua [习近平
： 在 民 营 企 业 座 谈 会 上 的 讲 话 ] (Xi Jinping: Speech at the Symposium of Private
Enterprises)
PEOPLE’S
DAILY,
(Nov.
1,
2018),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1102/c64094-30377329.html
[https://perma.cc/T6ZN-RRLP].
180
Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 6.
181
Of course, and as reviewed above, China’s political economy is also the
source of the institutional weaknesses in the legal system and of state capture to
begin with.
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their investors should be recognized as well and are rarely
discussed.
i.

Anti-Corruption and Corporate Wrongdoing

A recent institutional reform centralized all anti-corruption
work in China under a National Supervisory Commission. 182 As
part of the reorganization, the Communist Party’s Central
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI)—a political
institution and the Party’s primary investigative and disciplinary
body—was institutionalized, legalized, and placed under the new
state agency.
Following the reform, the CCDI is now assigned to all
investigatory powers, including concerning violations by non-partymember state functionaries. The new agency is, therefore, a Party-led
state organ, 183 with an all-encompassing authority to not only
supervise and investigate but also to sanction misconduct of both
Party and state agents.184
At least formally, corruption cases involving criminal offenses
(such as bribery, embezzlement, and seeking improper gains) must
be transferred to traditional legal institutions (the People’s
Procuratorate and the People’s Courts) to be prosecuted according
to the criminal law but following a CCDI investigation and in addition
to any disciplinary sanction the CCDI applies.185
182
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [中华人民共和国监察法] (The
Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China) (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter PRC Supervision Law], art.
11(2),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/21/content_2052362.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZS95-SVLM] (listing corruption among the “duty-related
violations” that a Supervisory Commission is entrusted to investigate and enforce
against, together with “bribery, abuse of power, neglect of duty, power rentseeking, tunneling, practice of favoritism and falsification, as well as the waste of
state assets”).
183
Chris Buckley, In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be Above
the
Law,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinpinganticorruption.html [https://perma.cc/2BZA-GZCX]; Jeremy Daum, Unsupervised
—Initial Thoughts on the Supervisory Law, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/unsupervised/
[https://perma.cc/973G-MQU6].
184
PRC Supervision Law, supra note 182, arts. 15-18, 41, 43.
185
Before the recent institutional reform, there was a similar reliance in
corruption cases involving criminal offense. For data from before the structural
reform, see Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party, 3 CHINA PERSP. 41,43-45 (2014).
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The reform in anti-corruption work also has direct implications
for corporations. It expands the scope of Party anti-corruption and
disciplinary authority and methods over additional millions of
public sector organizations and individuals, many of whom are not
party members. 186 Corporatized SOEs and their state-appointed
managers and other functionaries are now formally included as
well. 187 This change also potentially subjects all employees of SOEs
that could be viewed as civil servants, or as performing public roles,
to political disciplinary enforcement.188
Furthermore, the term “SOE” is interpreted broadly and may
include firms with minority state holdings, thus further broadening
the scope of ostensibly private entities and individuals under CCP
disciplinary supervision as well.189
The Party’s political-disciplinary inspection and enforcement
efforts have thus been intensified not only toward social control in
general but also specifically with respect to firms and their

186
Jun Mai, How China’s New Anti-Graft Super Body Will Work, and Why Calling
a Lawyer Won’t Be an Option, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 17, 2017, 9:31 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120175/howchinas-new-anti-graft-super-body-will-work-and-why [https://perma.cc/L92VA4NL].
187
PRC Supervision Law, supra note 182, art. 15.
188 Id. at art. 15 (3) & (6).
189
While the Supervision Law itself does not define the term SOEs, this broad
interpretation is reflected in other relevant regulatory documents such as the SOE
Reform Guiding Opinions, infra note 200 (noting that in commercial SOEs the state
“may be the absolute or relative controlling shareholder, or be merely a
shareholder”). Moreover, the SOE Assets Law refers to state invested enterprises.
See SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 2 (“‘state-owned assets’ as mentioned in this
Law refers to the rights and interests formed by the various forms of investment of
the state in enterprises”); SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 5 (“The term ‘stateinvested enterprise’ as mentioned in this Law refers to a wholly state-owned
enterprise or company with the state being the sole investor, or a company in which
the state has a stake, whether controlling or non-controlling.”). SOEs in many other
occasions are viewed by Chinese authorities in the broader sense to include
enterprises with state capital. See, e.g., Criminal Code, Guojia Tongji Ju Guanyu Dui
Guoyou Gongsi Qiye Rending Yijian de Han, Guo Tong Han [2003] 44 Hao [国家统计局
关于对国有公司企业认定意见的函国统函 [2003]44 号] (Letter by National Bureau of
Statistics about Opinions on the Recognition of State Owned Companies [2003] No. 4),
WECHAT
(Sept.
9,
2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIzNTg5MDU5Mg==&mid=2247483940&i
dx=2&sn=e5f35bf2b76b81944f841d6000398c2a&chksm=e8e170ebdf96f9fd6c4f0009
3f5df8124d88c15f1dfc20dce44e368f75801695e8b539a84654&mpshare=1&scene=21
&srcid=0925SXZAhbMNO75u65uaPVHi#wechat_redirect
[https://perma.cc/FD6Q-SSMY].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

976

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

insiders.190 As the number of corruption investigations related to
corporatized SOEs has risen,191 SOEs and their insiders seem to have
been “targeted.”192
1. Enhanced Corporate Monitoring
Enforcement against corporate-related corruption contributes to
market regularity.
Notably, however, the most interesting
contribution anti-corruption work has to offer to corporate
governance is made through enhanced intra-firm monitoring.
Targeting corporate corruption is made easier through a
collaborative effort with an intra-firm Party organization that
facilitates monitoring over corporate insiders.
Indeed, the Party has a ready tool at the firm level to monitor
corporate insiders and to hold them accountable for corporate
corruption and related misconducts. This access is nestled in the
Party’s intra-firm presence—the corporate “Party Committee” (also
known as “Party organization”) whose corporate governance
authorities have recently been formalized and broadened.
The Constitution of the CCP, 193 as well as the PRC Company
Law, prescribe a role for a Party Committee in any company
190 See Yuen, supra note 185, at 41-42 (pointing out how Xi’s campaign is
different from previous anti-corruption campaigns in that respect).
191
Angela Meng, A Quarter of Chinese SOEs Executives Investigated for
Corruption Work in Energy Sector, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:45 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1778702/quarterchinese-soe-executives-investigated-corruption [https://perma.cc/C57Z-EAVZ]
(noting that between November 2012 and April 2013 alone, CCDI investigated 124
SOE executives, a quarter of which lead companies in the state-run energy sector,
while another thirteen percent worked in infrastructure and twelve percent headed
companies in telecommunications).
192 Id. See also Frank Fang, Anti-Corruption Campaign Targets China’s StateOwned
Enterprises,
EPOCH
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2015),
https://www.theepochtimes.com/anti-corruption-campaign-targets-chinas-stateowned-enterprises_1256832.html [https://perma.cc/9UTF-UZN6] (reporting that
the CCDI had marked twenty-six central SOEs as targets for its next round of
investigations); Lucy Hornby, China’s Anti-Corruption Drive Targets Sinopec: Oil
Group Among Several State-Owned Enterprises to Face Probe, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/f0cc6d0a-7b82-11e4-a695-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/5CB9-C59F].
193
ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ZHANGCHENG [ 中 国 共 产 党 章 程 ] (THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA) (as amended and promulgated
by the Nat’l Cong. of the Communist Party of China, Oct. 24, 2017). The CCP
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established and registered in the territory of China with at least three
party members,194 regardless of the firm’s shareholder ownershipbase, place of actual operation, or share issuance. This intra-firm
presence practically means that the CCP has an assigned and
distinct corporate capacity within many Chinese firms, whether
these are private or state-controlled firms, foreign-invested or not.
This political presence in firms is not new,195 but historically, a
Party Committee was not deployed systematically outside several
meaningful state-controlled firms. Furthermore, the relationship
between this political body and the formal corporate governance
structure was opaque.196 Both aspects are now changing.
First, concerning publicly listed firms specifically, a requirement
to set up a Party organization was further established in the 2018
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance of listed firms. 197
Recent data shows that the number of firms with a Party
organization with corporate governance capacities reflected in their

Constitution, as opposed to the Company law, does not limit the relevant provision
to “companies” and in fact extends to all forms of enterprises. See id., art. 30 (“a
primary Party Organization will be formed in every enterprise . . . where there are
at least three full members of the Party”). Note: the Constitution of the Chinese
Communist Party (also known as the “CCP Charter”) is distinct from the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and formally applies on the Party
organization and its members only.
194
2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 19 (“The Chinese Communist Party
may, according to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, establish its
organizations in companies to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party.
The company shall provide necessary conditions to facilitate the activities of the
Party.”).
195
The role of a Party organization in firms has long preceded the 2005
Company Law. The 1993 Company law similarly stated: “[t]he grass roots
organizations of the Communist Party of China in a company shall carry out their
activities according to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.” 1993
Company Law, supra note 61, art. 17.
196
The Company law itself does not specify the particular roles of the
corporate Party Committee.
197
Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5.
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charter, state-controlled as well as private and including firms that
are listed in foreign markets,198 has significantly risen.199
Second, three meaningful developments recently added clarity
to the corporate governance functions of a Party Committee within
firms while specifically addressing monitoring functions:
1) Chapter Five of the Constitution of the CCP clarifies some of
the monitoring and governance roles of such political institution
within firms;
2) A joint CCP Central Committee and State Council
document—“SOE Reform Guiding Opinions”—emphasizes the
obligation to formally establish a Party Committee in SOEs and
describes its corporate governance roles in detail;200
198
A Hong Kong–based media website reported on 123 Hong Kong-listed
Chinese firms that amended their articles of incorporation between 2017 and 2018
to implement such requirement or formalize existing Party Committees. Sun Leqi,
Yu 120 Zhongzigu Sheli Dangwei Quanli Kong Lingjia Dongshihui [More Than 120
Chinese Stocks set up Party Committees for fear of Overriding the Board of Directors],
APPLE
DAILY
(Sept.
26,
2018),
https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20180926/58722466
[https://perma.cc/E2VQ-MVGQ]. See also Shirley Yam, Regulators’ Silence on
Communist Party Presence in Listed State Companies is Deafening, S. CHINA MORNING
POST
(July
22,
2016,
5:07
PM),
http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1993277/regulators-silence-communistparty-presence-listed-state-companies [https://perma.cc/RFB2-NL63].
199
See generally Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Party Building or
Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance,
EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. (Working Paper No. 493/2020, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510342 [https://perma.cc/2L5M-5UYJ] (empirically
analyzing the adoption of “party-building” provisions in PRC listed firms, statecontrolled as well as private); John Zhuang Liu & Angela Huyue Zhang, Ownership
and Political Control: Evidence from Charter Amendments, 60 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1
(2019) (observing differences in the responsiveness time and in the amendment’s
language between SOEs with higher state ownership, finding quicker and more
extensive amendment, to those with lower state ownership, finding slower and
vague amendments); Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 30-31 (noting cases of early
adopters).
200
Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Guoyou Qiye
Gaige de Zhidao Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见]
(Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and
the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises) (Aug. 24,
2015) [hereinafter “SOE Reform Guiding Opinions,” or “Guiding Opinions”],
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/
content_2930440.htm [https://perma.cc/22R4-AWWY]. Section 1 article (3) states:
“the Party organizations of SOEs shall enjoy a more solid statutory position in
corporate governance, and fully display their core political role . . . .” For a list of
subsequent guidance and regulations, see Guoke Jun Hu Dongyang, Guoqi Dangjian
Gongzuo Jin Zhangcheng Lujing Ji Jizhi Fenxi [国企党建工作进章程——路径及机制分
析 ] (Regulations for Party Building Work in State-owned Enterprises: Path and
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3) A parallel (albeit less formal) national-level policy strives to
establish an intra-firm Party organization in private sector
companies.
Chapter Five in the CCP Constitution reflects the corporate Party
Committee as a firm-internal political body that is assigned to
facilitate the Party’s monitoring and disciplinary functions and
other Party goals internally within firms, as well as to verify
compliance with state laws. 201 Art. 32(7) states that the Party
committee is assigned to make sure that
Party and non-Party cadres strictly observe the law and
administrative discipline and the financial and economic
statutes and regulations on personnel of the state and that
none of them infringe on the interests of the state, the
collective or the masses”. Art. 32(8), “to encourage Party
members and the people to consciously resist unacceptable
practices and resolutely fight against all violations of Party
discipline or state law”. Art 33, “Primary-level Party
organizations in non-public sector entities shall implement
the Party’s principles and policies, guide and oversee their
enterprises’ observance of state laws and regulations . . . .
Similarly, the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, an obligatory
document for all SOEs, provide more clarity on the particular
corporate governance roles of a Party Committee within SOEs.
Important in this context, SOEs are enterprises with state assets,
including wholly state-owned firms and state-controlled firms, and
also firms in which the state is a minority shareholder. Indeed, the
Guiding Opinions make clear that establishing a Party organization
and carrying out Party work is a prerequisite to pushing forward
mixed ownership in SOEs,202 meaning enterprises with both private
Mechanism
Analysis),
ZHONG
LUN
VIEW
(Aug.
1,
2017),
http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2017/08-01/1843041618.html
[https://perma.cc/WHD2-VCYK].
201
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, as amended, supra
note 193Error! Bookmark not defined., Ch. 5, Arts. 32(7), (8), (33). For a comparison
between the 2017 amendment and the former 2012 version, see Yitu Dudong:
<Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng> Xiugai Duibi Yi Lanbiao [一图读懂: 《中国共
产 党 章 程 》 修 改 对 比 一 览 表 ] (One Picture to Understand: Comparison List of
Amendments to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China), S. WEEKLY NEWS
(Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.infzm.com/content/130258 [https://perma.cc/J5P8FVZW].
202
SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 200Error! Bookmark not
defined., art. 7(24).
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and state investments. It should be noted that the identity of the
private investor in these mixed-ownership firms does not have to be
Chinese, and thus these recently enacted provisions apply also to
foreign-invested joint ventures and publicly-listed firms—including
those listed on foreign stock exchanges—in which the Chinese state
has even a minority stake.203
In these firms, the corporate governance roles of the Party
Committee explicated by the Guiding Opinions extend far beyond
the ideological education and social responsibility tasks that are
perhaps to be expected from a body of this nature. As I elaborate
elsewhere, they encompass a direct and now explicit role in
corporate decision making as well.204
Concerning monitoring, specifically, the Party organization is
established to function as the leading organ within the firm assigned
to party line education, disciplinary inspection work, forming an
intra-firm accountability system, investigating the conduct of
enterprise leaders, strengthening inspections in SOEs, and easing
the work of anti-corruption institutions (i.e., CCDI).205 In the context
203 Cf. Simon Denyer, Command and control: China’s Communist Party Extends
Reach
into
Foreign
Companies,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
28,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/command-and-controlchinas-communist-party-extends-reach-into-foreigncompanies/2018/01/28/cd49ffa6-fc57-11e7-9b5d-bbf0da31214d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/GUM2-ZX83] (noting that some “American and European
companies involved in joint ventures with state-owned Chinese firms have been
asked . . . to give internal Communist Party cells an explicit role in decisionmaking”).
204
The level of de-facto political intervention in the decision-making process
of a particular firm varies and is affected by different firm characteristics. See
Groswald Ozery, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on “U.S. Investment in China’s Capital Markets and MilitaryIndustrial Complex,” March 19, 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/usinvestment-chinas-capital-markets-and-military-industrial-complex
[USCC
Testimony]; cf. Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 199Error! Bookmark not
defined. (measuring the effect of state ownership, cross listing, and political
connections on the rate of adoption of different party building provisions through
charter amendments and finding wide variations in the content of the provisions
adopted with respect to involvement in decision making).
205
Note, however, that the CCDI is not mentioned formally. See SOE Reform
Guiding Opinions, supra note 200Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 1(3), generally,
as well as art. 7(26) (“The Party organizations of SOEs shall earnestly perform their
duties as the primary players responsible, while their disciplinary inspection
agencies shall effectively perform supervisory responsibilities.”). The Guiding
Opinions also include an instruction to

keep using the thinking and methods of the rule of law to fight corruption,
fine-tune anti-corruption institutions and systems, strictly enforce the
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of corporate corruption, therefore, the Party Committee functions as
a type of a whistleblower for the Party.
Interestingly, corporatized SOEs are now required to
incorporate the Party Committee and explicate its powers in their
governing documents. 206 In publicly listed firms, such change
requires shareholders’ approval and public disclosure under the
PRC Company and Securities Laws.207 Through this requirement,
the operation of a Party Committee inside firms is disclosed to
foreign and domestic investors and the market at large. So far, the
data on such adoptions suggests that public firms and their
investors are not particularly alarmed by this aspect in the
politicization of corporate governance in China.208 The acquiesce of
major U.S. assets management firms to these requirements is also
suggestive of their support or at least indifference.209
The requirements (or expectations) from entirely privately held
firms, particularly foreign-invested and including privately owned
listed firms, are less clear. There is certainly a noticeable push210 by
the CCP to exercise its legal authority to establish a Party Committee
and conformity in an increasingly growing number of private
firms. 211 This push dovetails the tightening of control over the
provisions against formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance,
and strive to build effective mechanisms where enterprise leaders dare not
to, are not able to, and do not want to, engage in corrupt practices.
206
SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 200, art. 7(24). See also Code of
Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5.
207
The 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 37, sets revisions in the bylaws
under the authority of the shareholders’ meeting.
208
See discussion supra notes 198-199, 203-204.
209
See, e.g., Jennifer Hughes, BlackRock and Fidelity put China’s Communists into
Company laws, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/e91270a89364-11e7-bdfa-eda243196c2c [https://perma.cc/7HZY-75Z4]; Lingling Wei, Bob
Davis & Dawn Lim, China has one Powerful Friend left in the U.S.: Wall Street, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2020, 10:54 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-onepowerful-friend-left-in-the-u-s-wall-street-11606924454 [https://perma.cc/9CK8XAJV] (quoting BlackRock: “[t]he party committees already had a role in
governance . . . [the recent changes] made that [role] more clear and transparent.”).
210
See, e.g., Where’s the Party? How the Communist Party is Trying to Expand its
Influence in the Private Sector, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, at 43; Louise Lucas, China
government assigns officials to companies including Alibaba, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/055a1864-ddd3-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59
[https://perma.cc/X3AE-NFHJ]; see also Denyer, supra note 203.
211
With respect to publicly listed private firms, see Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt,
supra note 199 (finding almost six percent of privately owned enterprises listed in
China—143 firms—voluntarily amended their charters to include the Party’s role
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private sector more generally, which has been emphasized in both
rhetoric and Party-state policies in recent years.212
in the firm in response to the SOE reform program, even though they were not
subject to the policy). With respect to the private sector more generally, the Chinese
Private Enterprise Survey (a long-running survey commissioned by organs of the
Party-state) reports the rising number of private firms with Party organizations
(48.3 percent in 2018). See Neil Thomas, Party Committees in the Private Sector: Rising
Presence,
Moderate
Prevalence,
MACRO
POLO
(Dec.
16,
2020),
https://macropolo.org/party-committees-private-sector-china/?rp=e
[https://perma.cc/6S94-6HP7]. With respect to foreign-invested private firms
specifically, various reports show a relative low presence of Party organizations.
For example, only twelve percent of foreign-invested enterprises were reported to
have Party organizations in Hangzhou. Id. In Shanghai, among Shanghai
AmCham member organizations (out of a total 434 survey respondent companies),
nineteen percent of foreign-invested enterprises confirmed the presence of a Party
organization. See AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN SHANGHAI, 2018 CHINA BUSINESS REPORT
19,
https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/sites/default/files/201807/China_Business_Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8AV-BDNS].
212
Notably, three examples best illustrate this point. (1) Cent. Comm. of the
CCP & the State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Yingzao Qiyejia
Jiankang Chengzhang Huanjing Hongyang Youxiu Qiyejia Jingshen Geng Hao Fahui
Qiyejia Zuoyong de Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于营造企业家健康成长环境弘扬优秀
企业家精神更好发挥企业家作用的意见] (Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and
the State Council on Creating a Sound Entrepreneur Growth Environment, Advocating
Excellent Entrepreneurship and Better Using Entrepreneurs’ Role) (Sept. 8, 2017),
[hereinafter “Opinions on Entrepreneurs”] http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/201709/25/content_5227473.htm [https://perma.cc/X58S-4BUF]. As an example, art.
28 reads:
Entrepreneurs in the private sector shall be taught and guided in
upholding party leadership and supporting party building in enterprises.
A non-public owned enterprise party building work mechanism shall be
established and improved, various means of party building shall be
vigorously explored, and the party organization and work coverage in
non-public owned enterprises shall be expanded with efforts. The role of
party organizations as political cores among employees and the people
and in politically guiding enterprise development shall be fully used.
Id., art. 2. (2) Cent. Comm. of the CCP & the State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang
Guowuyuan Guanyu Yingzao Geng Hao Fazhan Huanjing Zhichi Minying Qiye Gaige
Fazhan de Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于营造更好发展环境支持民营企业改革发展的
意见] (Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Creating a Better
Development Environment and Supporting the Reform and Development of Private
Enterprises) (Dec. 4, 2019), [hereinafter “Opinions on Private Enterprises”]
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-12/22/content_5463137.htm
[https://perma.cc/4DZS-FTRE]. For example, article 22 highlights ways to
enhance the co-optation of entrepreneurs into the Party; article 26, in turn,
emphasizes Party-building work within private firms, such that “ . . . private
enterprises shall be guided in establishing Party organizations, actively exploring
and innovating the means of Party building work . . . .” Id., arts. 22, 26. (3) Gen.
Office of the Cent. Comm. of the CCP, Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Yinfa,
Guanyu Jiaqiang Xin Shidai Minying Jingji Tongzhan Gongzuo de Yijian [中共中央办公
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While the obligation to set a Party Committee even in entirely
privately-held listed firms was emphasized in the recent
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance,213 the scope of its
responsibilities and corporate governance mandates within such
listed firms is still largely vague.214 But while there are indications
that Party Committees’ involvement in the process of decisionmaking is more limited in these firms,215 there is no doubt that the
Party is asserting itself a greater role in supervising them,
monitoring the behavior of their insiders (and other private market
players), and strengthening their “law obedience,” as well as
enlisting private businesses’ help in anti-corruption work. 216
2. Increased Enforcement and Accountability
Assisted by its intra-firm Party Committee, the CCP’s
disciplinary bodies can use the corporate group structure to leverage
their detection efforts and expose potential violations not only in
firms within the corporate group but also in affiliated enterprises,
some of which completely private.
Particularly interesting is the use of business holding groups to
expose corrupt Party-state officials and corporate insiders. In
examining the ways that the corporate group is being utilized to
厅 印 发 、 关 于 加 强 新 时 代 民 营 经 济 统 战 工 作 的 意 见 ] (The CCP Opinions on
Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in a New Era) (Sept. 15,
2020),
[hereinafter
“United
Front
Work
Opinions”]
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm
[https://perma.cc/6PZX-PH74]. Article 3(6), for example, calls to “ . . . further
strengthen the Party building work of private enterprises and sincerely give full
play to the role of Party organizations”; Article 5(17) adds the importance
of“[e]ncourag[ing] private enterprises to participate in the reform of mixed
ownership” and “[g]uid[ing] private enterprises to improve their corporate
governance structure and explore the establishment of a modern corporate system
with Chinese characteristics . . . .” Id., arts. 3(6), 5(7).
213
See discussion supra note 197-198.
214
The various policies aimed at the private sector, supra note 212, mainly use
a non-obligatory rhetoric, commonly using words such as “guide,” “encourage,”
and “explore ways to.”
215
See, e.g., Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 199 (finding wide variations
between the types of firms and the adopted scope of Party involvement in
governance, with politically connected private firms adopting more Party building
decision-making provisions that non-connected firms).
216
See, e.g., Arts. 2, 9, 12-14 in the Opinions on Entrepreneurs; Arts. 4, 19, 26,
12 in the Opinions on Private Enterprises; and Arts. 3(9), 4(13), 5(18), 6(21) in the
United Front Work Opinions, supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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facilitate work against corruption, the following pattern seems
common: the CCDI starts its probe with a “disciplinary tour,”
during which it dispatches investigators into a specific statecontrolled holding group and presumably activates the Party
Committees within firms in a systematic search for corruption
(“crackdown” in the media). The “evidence” collected leads to the
investigations of several subsidiaries within the group and its
affiliates, including private firms. The investigation includes
interrogations of corporate employees, individual business
affiliates, and corporate insiders. The primary targets are often
high-level public figures with parallel business positions at the
group, yet many lower-level management and officials are also
removed during such probes.
In this way, the Party utilizes the corporate form and the
prevalent group holding structure to gain access to information and
to detect, punish, and deter against corruption and corporate
wrongdoing more generally. By harnessing corporations, the CCP
strengthens conformity with its political-disciplinary standards but
also detects corporate malfeasance. Importantly, this process may
or may not result in legal accountability. Thus, while these
alternative mechanisms show that corruption and corporate
wrongdoing are not without accountability and may benefit
investors through greater monitoring and increased discipline, the
accountability that this process brings for corporate wrongdoing is
political accountability. Recourse for injured investors is not part of
the process unless the process leads to further criminal or
administrative legal proceedings. Future empirical research could
provide data on how many CCDI corporate corruption cases result
in criminal prosecution and whether or not they trigger follow up
investigations by the CSRC that end up remedying investors’ loss.
ii.

Examples

Examples of the above can be seen in the targeted probes against
one of China’s most valuable sectors—energy. By targeting two of
its most important corporate groups, the CCDI opened a hornet’s
nest that led to the exposure and punishment (in some cases, both
disciplinary and legal enforcement) of several corrupt Party
members and state officials at the national and local levels, as well
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as senior business executives. 217 One of the cases is that of Jiang
Jiemin, who rose through the ranks of the oil industry to head
China’s biggest oil business, China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), 218 and was appointed as the head of SASAC. The pursuit
of Jiang (which some opined was motivated by his ties with Zhou
Yongkang, a political rival of Xi) 219 involved the detention,
investigation, and prosecution of dozens of senior managers in the
parent holding company CNPC, its listed subsidiary PetroChina,
whose shares trade in the stock exchanges of New York, Shanghai,
and Hong Kong, and even in some of its affiliated private firms for
corruption and corporate wrongdoing.220
A similar inspection was initiated thereafter into another of
China’s centrally controlled energy champions, Petroleum and
Chemicals Corporation (Sinopec Group) and its main listed
subsidiary, Sinopec Corp. Ltd., traded in the stock exchanges of
Shanghai, Hong Kong, New York, and London. The inspection into
Sinopec Group led to the detention of managers in several

217
Meng, supra note 191; Former China Energy Chief Jiang Jiemin Jailed for
Corruption, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-34503469 [https://perma.cc/A92N-UZE5] (presenting a “family tree” style
illustration of the cases involved in this investigation into the oil industry).
218
Jeremy Page, Wayne Ma & Brian Spegele, China Probes Former Oil Company
Head,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
1,
2013,
2:56
AM
ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-probes-former-oil-company-head1378018593 [https://perma.cc/6U36-5HF7].
219
Willy Lam, With Zhou’s Circle Down, Xi’s Purge May Turn to Hu, CHINA
BRIEF, July 3, 2014, at 3.
220
The proceedings against private affiliated firms are worth noting since they
instigated from, and likely rely on, evidence obtained during the political
disciplinary enforcement process. Donny Kwok & Charlie Zhu, PetroChina Supplier
Wison says Records Seized, can’t Contact Chairman, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:49 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-wison-cfo-idUKBRE98I01120130919
[https://perma.cc/UY79-NY9B] (in which the chairman and subsidiary executives
of HK-listed private firm Wison Engineering Services Co., Ltd., a major supplier of
PetroChina, were investigated as part of the corruption investigation in PetroChina
and its parent company CNPC). In March 2014, Wison’s founder, primary
shareholder, and chairman of the board was formally arrested. He was accused of
conspiracy to commit a “tender-offer fraud,” as well as offering bribes to state
officials. In August 2015, he was found guilty of offering bribes. Brian Spegele &
Wayne Ma, Wison Engineering Says Chinese Police Arrested Chairman, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 10, 2014, 11:45 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineeringchairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858
[https://perma.cc/N5W9-AHBQ]; PetroChina Supplier Wison says Found Guilty of
Bribery
in
China,
REUTERS
(Aug.
6,
2015,
9:41
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/wison-petrochina-idUSL3N10H08120150806
[https://perma.cc/ZN4U-L4AL].
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subsidiary firms, 221 finally reaching the president of the group,
Wang Tianpu. Wang, who chaired the Group’s board at the time
and was also the general manager of its listed subsidiary, was put
under Party disciplinary proceedings for taking bribes and for abuse
of power. Wang was removed from his corporate positions,
expelled from the Communist Party, and eventually prosecuted
under the criminal law.222
Similar recent probe targets include commercial and investment
vehicles operating off-shore (state-controlled as well as private),223
221
For instance, Xue Wandong, the vice-chairman and CEO of Sinopec
Oilfield Services Corp., was detained and investigated by the CCDI and dismissed
from his role in Sinopec immediately. See Hornby, supra note 192.
222
Zhongyang Zhongguo Shihua Dangzu Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai
Qingkuang Tongbao [中共中国石化党组关于巡视整改情况的通报] (Circular of the
Chinese Communist Party on the Inspection and Ratification in China Petroleum
Chemical Corporations) (promulgated by the CCDI, Apr. 30, 2015),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201504/t20150430_55638.html
[https://perma.cc/CZ5C-JEV4]; Zhongguo
Shiyouhuagong
Jituangongsi
Zongjingli Wang Tianpu Shexian Yanzhong Weijiweifa Jieshou Zuzhi Diaocha [中
国石油化工集团公司总经理王天普涉嫌严重违纪违法接受组织调查] (Notice by the
CCDI on the Disciplinary Investigation of Wang Tianpu, April) (promulgated by
the
CCDI,
Apr.
27,
2015),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201504/
t20150427_55436.html
[https://perma.cc/K7C9-82VP];
Zhongguo
Shiyou
Huagong Jituangongsi Yuan Dongshi, Zongjingli, Dangzuchengyuan Wang
Tianpu Yanzhong Weiji bei Kaichu Dangji [中国石油化工集团公司原董事、总经理
、党组成员王天普严重违纪被开除党籍] (Notice by the CCDI on Wang Tianpu’s
Expulsion from the Party, September) (promulgated by the CCDI, Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201509/t20150918_62038.html
[https://perma.cc/7Z3T-T4BS]. For a discussion on the subsequent legal criminal
prosecution, see China to prosecute former top executives for alleged
graft, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-corruption-sinopec-idUSKCN11W0VX [https://perma.cc/X7TV-VQJE].
223
One example of an investigation of a state-owned offshore commercial firm
is the case of Song Lin, the former chairman of China Resources, a Hong Kong based
trading company and one of China’s largest state-owned enterprises, who was
accused of power abuse in corporate dealings and was arrested in April 2014. Lin
was removed from his positions in the firm and the Party. Two years later, he was
charged under the criminal law. James T. Areddy & Laurie Burkitt, China
Communist Party Ousts Chairman of Major State-Owned Firm, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22,
2014, 1:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/communist-party-fires-song-linchairman-of-china-resources-holdings-as-corruption-fight-expands-1398187916
[https://perma.cc/F947-HPEU]; Choi Chi-yuk, Song Lin, Former Chairman of China
Resources, is Formally Charged with Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2016
1:08
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2052971/song-lin-former-chairman-china-resources-formally
[https://perma.cc/D5XU-TQWQ].
For other examples of SOE executives
investigated for corruption and released from their corporate role, see 9 Chinese
SOEs Slammed for Discipline Violations, XINHUA (JUNE 17, 2015),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-06/17/content_35840376.htm
[https://perma.cc/BV3X-YCZK].
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as well as the financial sector where measures have been taken to
dispatch CCDI teams within financial SOE conglomerates to
function “just like . . . surveillance cameras.”224
Some recent cases against ostensibly private firms, such as
Dalian Wanda, Fosun International, HNA Group, and Anbang
Insurance, emphasize how Party-led disciplinary enforcement
influences and determines the operations of state enforcement
actions in the private sector as well. These cases reflect that a CCDI
investigation has ripple effects throughout the investigated group
and its web of affiliates. They also reflect that Party-led enforcement
receives a high-level of collaboration from state institutions. For
example, SASAC, CSRC, and the China Banking Regulatory
Commission assisted in confiscating documents, freezing bank
accounts, stopping the trade in shares of firms under investigation,
and other measures.225 This assistance is given even before the case
formally reaches the legal system.
The above examples reflect how the ways in which the Partystate operates with respect to corruption has blurred the lines
between political anti-corruption discipline and legal enforcement
against corporate wrongdoing.
iii.

Sticks of Party Presence—Positive Market Effects

While the risks of political intervention are rather
straightforward and recognized, 226 and the long-term economic
effects are still to be seen, it is important to set forth the potential
positive externalities of this foreground of illiberal corporate
governance. The sticks of Party presence increase regularity in the
market and may improve investors’ confidence.

224
William Zheng, Anti-corruption Teams to be Installed at China’s State Banks
and Insurance Companies, Acting like ‘Human Surveillance Cameras,’ S. CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Nov.
6,
2018
9:35
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2171994/anti-corruptionteams-be-installed-chinas-state-banks-insurance [https://perma.cc/3WFS-7ZB9].
225 Id. Wison Engineering Services Co Ltd. bank accounts were frozen, and the
trade in its shares was suspended. See also, Lucy Hornby et al., Big China Companies
Targeted
over
‘Systemic
Risk’,
FIN.
TIMES
(June
23,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/23c8ba54-5710-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f
[https://perma.cc/V9TF-8S22] (reporting that the China Banking Regulatory
Commission had instructed banks to gather information on credit exposure)
226
See Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 61-62.
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One of the clearest positive externalities of more stringent
disciplinary enforcement against corporate corruption is the
removal of bad managers from Chinese firms. Anti-corruption tour
inspections in corporate groups could also decrease the number and
scope of undesirable related-party transactions, which are extremely
frequent within SOE business groups.227
A 2020 study examined the characteristics of the firms
investigated between 2012 and 2019 as part of the anti-corruption
campaign. The study constructed a sample of over 400 Chinese
listed firms where top executives were investigated. The authors
found that firms with characteristics that are commonly associated
with poor governance, such as self-dealing and inefficiencies, were
more likely to be investigated. This suggests that the anti-corruption
campaign has enforcement spillovers on corporate wrongdoing
more broadly and indeed captures firms with weak governance.228
Having the CCP directly involved in corporate inspections can
also raise the overall level of compliance, by creating fear
governance with possible deterrence effects on additional forms of
corporate misconduct, such as self-dealing, waste, and fraud,
throughout the firm and its network of affiliates.229
Other studies examined the broad market effects of anticorruption work. One study found that the anti-corruption
campaign has a positive effect on the ability of small entrepreneurial
firms to grow and compete, citing its contribution to entrepreneurial
market-entry and more efficient allocation of resources as positive
factors. 230 Another study linked CCDI investigations with the
See supra notes 69, 82, and 83.
John M. Griffin et al., Is the Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign Authentic?
Evidence from Corporate Investigations (June 7, 2020) (paper presented at the 29 th
Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429
[https://perma.cc/RZ8MRLHV]. Notwithstanding these results, the authors find little evidence that there is
a broad decrease in corporate corruption indictors. Id. They evaluate that the
campaign did not lead to overall improvement in corporate governance outside
certain behaviors, nor resulted in greater information transparency. Id.
229
For the indirect effect of sanctions on non-punished peer firms in China,
see Francesco D’Acunto et al., Punish One, Teach a Hundred: The Sobering Effect of
Punishment on the Unpunished (University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for
Economics, Working Paper No. 2019-12, 2019), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wpcontent/uploads/BFI_WP_201912.pdf [https://perma.cc/W89Z-6NQ7].
230
Mariassunta Giannetti et al., The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from
Entrepreneurial Firms in China (European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance
Working
Paper
No.
536/2017,
2020),
227
228
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availability of credit. The authors posit that anti-corruption
enforcement reallocates credit from less productive SOEs to more
productive non-SOEs.231
Sticks of Party presence could also have a positive marketsignaling effect. As discussed, the primary concern of public
investors in China today is not the expropriation of their property
rights by the Party-state, but rather their abuse by corporate insiders
and rogue officials. The politicization of corporate governance may
signal to investors that the Party-state is committed to economic
growth and that self-dealing and corruption are now kept at bay by
a strict enforcer.
Two recent studies tracked cumulative abnormal returns of
Chinese listed firms following different announcements related to
anti-corruption work. The results show that the overall stock market
responses to announcements of CCDI inspections were significantly
positive.232 One of these studies looked at firms that are listed both
in China and on the Hong Kong stock exchange, concluding that the
expectation of reduced corruption adds value to listed firms overall
in both markets.233 A third study examined the effect of the antihttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897558
[https://perma.cc/ZCQ2-UBHR] (finding: (1) “entertainment expenses”—a
common measure of potential corruption and a way for control parties to siphon
private benefits of control— in big firms decreased following Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign; (2) anti-corruption measures have alleviated barriers for small
businesses and made it easier for them to compete; and (3) following Xi’s anticorruption campaign, state subsidies for R&D became significantly positively
associated with future innovation, meaning higher innovative efficiency and lower
influence of corruption-related expenditures); Mariassunta Giannetti & Xiaoyun
Yu, The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Small and Incumbent Firms
in China, CEPR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/anti-corruption-andentrepreneurial-activity-china [https://perma.cc/TUK2-DL8Z].
231
Bo Li et al., China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from
SOEs to Non-SOEs (PBCSF-NIFR, Research Paper No. 17-01, 2017, rev’d July 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908658
[https://perma.cc/9PTB-Y5G6].
232
Haoyuan Ding et al., Equilibrium Consequences of Corruption on Firms:
Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (Jan. 2020) (National Bureau of
Economic
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
26656,
2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26656/w26656.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LY5-NQS2].
233
Chen Lin et al., What Do We Learn from Stock Price Reactions to China’s First
Announcement of Anti-Corruption Reforms? (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working
Paper
No.
22001,
2016,
rev’d
Aug.
2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22001/w22001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5ES-N2L3]. The study also identified different impact levels
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corruption campaign on market reaction concerning what the
authors call “relational spending” (measured by business
entertainment expenses). The authors found a weaker effect of
relational spending on share-price crash risk following the anticorruption campaign. They posited that the anti-corruption
campaign reduced information opacity and minimized investors’
perception of risks from relational spending, concluding that the
campaign contributes to corporate monitoring. 234
In this sense, political institutions are filling a signaling role in
an environment where publicly disclosed information is limited and
unreliable.235
It is still too early to decisively determine how the various
corporate governance roles of the CCP will be implemented in
different firms and sectors and what would be their relative longterm effects. 236 The impact on the long-term availability of public
finance is thus still to be seen.
Nonetheless, the analysis above suggests that at least with
respect to enhanced monitoring and enforcement, the corporate
capacity of the CCP has positive market effects and potential
contributions to firm value.
In the Chinese context, therefore, an illiberal and even politicized
corporate governance deploys both carrots and sticks that improve
market regularity and provide the assurances needed for investors
to continue supplying capital.
depending on prior market liberalization. Id. Firms in capital markets that are
better set to allocating recourses efficiently experienced higher cumulative
abnormal returns. Id.
234
Hu et al., Corporate Relationship Spending and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence
from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, 113 J. BANKING & FIN. 1, 8 (2019).
235
This is somewhat similar to how in twentieth-century Japan, monitoring
by reputable industrialists recruited to the boards of Japanese firms compensated
for informational inefficiencies in the Japanese market. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in
Transitional Japan, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 273-5 (2002).
236
The empirical task is complicated as each element in the politicization of
corporate governance could produce different market results. The impact of the
CCP’s increased monitoring in firm would need to be off set against the impact of
other Party building elements (e.g., its relative involvement in corporate decision
making across industries and ownership structures). For an attempt to observe
market reactions to the CCP’s Party building efforts in firms, see Lauren Yu-Hsin
Lin et al., Political Influence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Party-Building
Reform in China (Dec. 21, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510002
[https://perma.cc/QFW9-MFY7] (observing market reaction following
announcements on party-building policies as well as in response to subsequent
charter amendments.).
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As a side note, it is interesting to mention that the anticorruption campaign has another, more surprising, externality. It
seems to have an effect on the corporate conduct of multinational
U.S. firms! 237 A recent U.S. SEC report found a surge in Chinadomiciled whistle-blowers with respect to misconduct in
multinational and U.S. firms, which some suggested was affected by
China’s anti-corruption efforts. 238
Thus, illiberal corporate
governance in China could even be contributing to the
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform. This effect
on foreign-domiciled firms and investors outside of China indicates
additional positive externalities of China’s governance methods that
are completely disregarded.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Over the past decade, concerns about China’s corporate
governance practices and the potential risks for U.S. investors
started gaining the attention of policymakers in the United States.239
237
Matthew S. Erie, Anticorruption as Transnational Law: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, PRC Law, and Party Rules in China, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971092 [https://perma.cc/U4JF-F5XA]. (discussing
how the overlapping systems of anti-corruption in the United States and China
form a transnational law compliance system).
238
Andy Rickman, How China and the US Are Emboldening Whistle-Blowers in
the Fight against Corporate Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 27, 2017, 12:38
PM), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2121681/howchina-and-us-are-emboldening-whistle-blowers-fight [https://perma.cc/ZT9H5Y7M].
239
Regulatory attention to matters of corporate governance in China started
gaining steam in 2007 when Chinese and Hong Kong audit firms first refused to
grant access to data about China-based U.S. issuers that was requested in the
process of U.S. audit inspections. The PCAOB issued an audit quality alert,
expressing concerns about the quality of audits in such firms. Staff Audit Practice
Alert No. 6, PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., July 12, 2010,
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/2010-07-12_APA_6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PNT-7P6M]. Following a series of fraud allegations in Chinabased reverse merger listed firms, several insiders of China-based listed firms were
charged with securities fraud, and administrative processing were taken against the
Chinese local branches of the “big four” accounting firms for refusing to produce
relevant audit work papers. Press Release, SEC Charges China-Based Executives with
Securities
Fraud,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EX .
COMM.,
Feb.
22,
2012,
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-31htm
[https://perma.cc/Y4JQ-HFP9]; Press Release, SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big
Four Accounting Firms with Violating U.S. Securities Law in Refusing to Produce
Documents, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., Dec. 3, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2012-2012-249htm [https://perma.cc/4XTU-B7SW].
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These concerns regained momentum in 2018 against the backdrop
of the U.S.-China trade war and the escalating political pressures in
favor of an “economic decoupling” from China.240
Most of the attention so far was given to the risks of investing in
Chinese firms that participate in U.S. financial markets. Still, some
attention is given to the potential risks for U.S. investors when they
invest in publicly listed Chinese firms outside the U.S. market (i.e.,
investments in China’s capital market or in Chinese firms whose
shares trade in other global exchanges).241
Given a rising global financial integration, efforts to rethink
investors’ interests and protections are worthy. Markets today
involve players and countries with different corporate governance
regimes and economic systems. The effects of corporate governance
no longer flow in one direction. Regulatory frameworks, therefore,
cannot afford to maintain local orientation while financial markets
are globalizing. Increasing awareness and understanding of the
financial risks involved in global investments is a first step.
Yet, this cannot be fulfilled without also considering what
attracts investors to Chinese firms and what keeps them invested
notwithstanding those risks. Understanding the source of investors’
confidence requires us to look at the full array of China’s corporate
governance mechanisms—whether conventional or nonconventional, market-oriented or illiberal, formal or informal. The
positive externalities of state capacities and political influence are
part of the package and yet are completely disregarded in recent
policy and academic debates.
The regulatory steps that were taken recently reflect an
orthodox, oversimplified view of state ownership, control, and
political influence, and misconceptions about their full impact on
investors, firms, and the markets in which they trade.
240 Public Companies that are Audit Clients of PCAOB-Registered Firms from NonU.S. Jurisdictions Where the PCAOB is Denied Access to Conduct Inspections, PUB. CO.
ACCT.
OVERSIGHT
BD.,
(updated
Oct.
1,
2020),
https://pcaobus.org/oversight/international/denied-access-to-inspections
[https://perma.cc/ZP3E-JWL6] (noting 221 U.S. issuers where the PCAOB was
experiencing obstacles in inspecting the auditor’s work); Statement from Jay
Clayton et al., Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to
Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion of Current Information Access
Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed companies with Significant Operations in China,
U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-vital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-andother#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/AC66-MCYG].
241 A Congressional Commission Hearing on the subject, including my
testimony, was held on March 19, 2021, supra note 204.
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a. Investments in China-Based U.S. Issuers
Policymakers’ approach to the risks of investing in China-based
U.S. issuers has focused on the quality of disclosures by issuers,242
and the inability of U.S. regulators to oversee their audit works and
execute judgments 243 due to limitations enshrined in PRC law. 244
Most recently, in December 2020, Congress stepped in and enacted
the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCA Act, or the
Act). 245 The Act parts away from a financial risk disclosure
approach and instead requires China-based issuers, through their
auditors, to comply with U.S. auditing oversight rules or be delisted
from trade.
Following the Act, the SEC is required to identify all U.S.reporting issuers whose financial statements were audited by
registered accounting firms with an office or a branch in a foreign
jurisdiction, and which the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB)246 is unable to inspect due to limitations imposed by
the authorities of such foreign jurisdiction.247 With respect to such
identified issuer, if the SEC will determine that the PCAOB is not
able to inspect the issuer’s audits for three consecutive years, the
SEC would be required to prohibit trade in its securities.248
242
Disclosure Considerations for China-Based Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM.,
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/disclosure-considerations-chinabased-issuers [https://perma.cc/RC3C-9SES].
243
Clayton et al., supra note 240; Statement from Clayton et al., Emerging
Market Investments Entail Significant Disclosure, Financial Reporting and Other Risks;
Remedies are Limited, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM. (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/emerging-market-investmentsdisclosure-reporting [https://perma.cc/JT8U-YDKT].
244
For PRC laws and practices restricting access to information maintained in
China, see Huang, Robin Hui, The US-China Audit Oversight Dispute: Causes,
Solutions, and Implications for Hong Kong, INT’L LAWYER (forthcoming 2021)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3708068 [https://perma.cc/S3FE-YUN4]; Fried and
Kamar, supra note 44, pp. 11-19.
245
The Bill introducing the HFCA was approved by the Senate in May 2020
and by the House of Representatives in December 2020. It was signed into law on
Dec.
18,
2020.
See
S.
945,
116th
Cong.
(2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/945/text
[https://perma.cc/5FZP-KUTX].
246
The PCAOB oversees the accounting profession in the United States by
establishing auditing standards for public accounting firms and is responsible for
inspecting registered accounting firms and their audit of U.S. issuers.
247
HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i) (2)(A).
248
HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i) (3).
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Since the ability of China-based issuers and their auditors to
cooperate with U.S. auditing work inspection requirements is
confined by PRC laws,249 compliance with the Act would compel
them to violate PRC law. China is unlikely to amend its laws in
response to the Act. Commentators, therefore, believe that the Act
would result in a broad delisting of China-based U.S. issuers which
would cause economic losses to their investors.250 Chinese firms will
be pushed to go private or seek finance elsewhere.251 U.S. investors
will either miss out on good investment opportunities or will find
ways to invest in Chinese firms through other, less regulated, and
thus lesser protective markets.
Alternatively, China-based issuers that wish to remain in the
U.S. market while complying with Chinese laws would be forced to
seek approval from the Chinese government to disclosure
information. The Act, therefore, will have the unintended result of
increasing the dependency of these firms on the Chinese
government. China’s Party-state will now be able to veto which
China-based firms remain listed on U.S. exchanges.
Aside from these potential implications, the Act does not stop
there. Curiously, the Act is imbued with confusing provisions that
try to identify government ownership and political influence over
China-based issuers:
Apart from a potential delisting sanction, the Act requires
issuers identified by the SEC as described above to submit
documentation that show that the issuer is not owned or controlled
See, supra note 244.
See, e.g., Jesse Fried & Matthew J. Schoenfeld, Delisting Chinese Firms: A
Cure Likely Worse than the Disease, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOV., (June 9,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/09/delisting-chinese-firms-acure-likely-worse-than-the-disease/
[https://perma.cc/62UT-EXAZ];
Dave
Michaels & Alexander Osipovich, Congress Sets Stage for Exiling Chinese Stocks from
U.S. over Audit Dispute, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 2, 2020 5:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-sets-stage-for-exiling-chinese-stocksfrom-u-s-over-audit-dispute-11606946071
[https://perma.cc/99CA-KVUW].
Note, however, the Act does leave discretion to the SEC in determining its inability
to inspect an issuer. There thus could be room for the SEC to avoid automatic
delisting and establish auditing cooperation with the CSRC, determining the
PCAOB’s “inability to inspect” on such basis. HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i)(3)(A).
251
Eleven going-private transactions and ten secondary listings of Chinabased U.S. issuers, including Alibaba, JD.com, NetEase, have been put to process
over the past year. China’s global financial integration makes finance from other
markets readily available. Joanne Chiu & Frances Yoon, Ahead of U.S. Audit Bill,
Chinese Companies Are Finding Their Way Home, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 3, 2020 7:18 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ahead-of-u-s-audit-bill-chinese-companies-arefinding-their-way-home-11606997906 [https://perma.cc/5Z5L-K87E].
249
250
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by a government entity in the foreign jurisdiction where its financial
statements were audited. 252
If the issuer identified by the SEC as described above is also a
“U.S. foreign issuer,” 253 it is required to disclose the following
additional information in its reports for each year during which the
PCAOB is unable to inspect:254
1) The percentage of shares owned by government entities
where the issuer is incorporated or “otherwise organized”
(presumably, referring to its registered domicile);
2) Whether government entities in the foreign jurisdiction where
the registered public accounting firm has a branch that audit the
issuer’s financial reporting, have a controlling financial interest in
the issuer;
3) The name of each CCP official who is a member of the board
of directors of the issuer, or of its affiliated Chinese operating entity;
4) Whether the organizing document of the issuer (i.e., articles of
association, bylaws) contains any “charter” of the CCP and the text
of such charter.
The purpose and the added value of these disclosure
requirements for investors are not clear, especially given that fraud
cases in China-based U.S. issuers so far did not involve state-owned
companies. The consequences for issuers as well are unspecified.
First, concerning state capacities—the Act does not define
“control by a government,” nor what having a “controlling financial
interests” means in the case of foreign issuers. The U.S. Securities
Act and the Exchange Act define “control” as “the possession, direct
or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”255
An approach that looks beyond formal share ownership to
establish control is appropriate. As seen throughout this Article, in
many respects the state in China possesses the power to direct
companies in a variety of means that extend beyond the state’s

252
This is a simplification of the text. For original text, see HCFA, supra note
245, § 2 (i)(2)(A).
253
For definition, see supra note 35.
254
HFCA, supra note 245, § 3(b).
255
Securities Act of 1933, Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (emphasis added) (defining “control,” including
the terms ”controlling,” “controlled by,” and ”under common control with”).
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ownership capacity (though this may be true for governments
anywhere).256
Nonetheless, employing the above definition of control in the
case of government control would enable an overly broad
interpretation that could result in any and all China-based issuers
considered to be controlled by the PRC government.
While the state in principle possesses the power to direct
companies outside its shareholding capacity, it does not necessarily
do so. Even in its shareholding capacity, where it is not a controlling
shareholder by PRC law definition, 257 and aside from specific
decisions for which the state has boosted rights even as a noncontrolling investor,258 the PRC government seems inclined to stay
away from significant involvement. Various policy measures and
regulations were put in place to limit the state’s (and the Party’s)
intervention, in its shareholding capacity, in day-to-day decision
making where it does not hold significant voting rights.259 As noted
earlier, the lack of exercising the state’s shareholder capacity
enabled the phenomena of insiders’ control in Chinese firms.260
From an investor’s perspective, applying to China-based firms a
broad interpretation of “control” that looks at the possession of the
power to direct the firm, as in the existing definition of control above,
might wrongfully lead investors to believe that the issuer’s day-today decisions are indeed routinely directed by the Chinese
government.
There ought to be a reconceptualization of what control means
with respect to governments and a refining of what circumstances
of exercising control the Act seeks to prevent. Hopefully, the SEC
would add clarity in subsequent rules.261
Second, concerning the Act’s requirements for disclosure of the
presence of the CCP in the issuer: the recent Party building efforts
and its pronounced goal to institutionalize its presence in firms
256
On the state’s share ownership and control through organizational
structures, see supra Part III.A.2. On control in other means of state capacity, see
supra Part IV.A.
257
For the definition, see supra note 92.
258
For instances where the state has “boosted” shareholders rights even as a
minority investor see, supra notes 93, 94.
259
See Groswald Ozery, USCC Testimony, supra note 204.
260
Supra Part III.A.
261
HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i)(2)(B) (requiring the SEC to issue, within ninety
days of enactment, rules that clarify the forms by which a relevant issuer can
established that it is not owned or controlled by a government entity in the foreign
jurisdiction where its financial statements were audited).
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clearly show that the Party-state is not trying to conceal the CCP’s
place in the market but rather to own it. As long as it is clear that an
issuer is based in China (operating assets and/or insiders based in
China), investors can assume that the CCP has some scope of
influence on the firm even without having this disclosed on U.S.
exchange platforms. Foreign institutional investors indeed seem to
have assumed such presence and considered it in their risk
assessments even before the push in recent years to formalize it
further.262
The proxies used in the Act to ascertain potential Party influence
are enigmatic. Potential Party influence cannot be assessed based
solely on what is indicated by conventional corporate governance
institutions. For example, who are “Party officials” on the board for
the purposes of the Act? Are these members of the board that also
receive a salary from the CCP? Party committee members, for
example, are often paid by the firm itself (perhaps with some
operative allowances from a higher supervising Party organization).
What about board members with membership in one of the political
organizations at the behest of the CCP that are not also “Party
officials” (e.g., members of the Communist Youth Lead or the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions)? What about former Party
officials on the board? The Act seems to assume that the lines of
CCP influence on boards are determined by existing officialdom
status. The reality is much more complex.263
Similarly, having provisions that set up the CCP’s corporate
presence formally included in the firm’s organizing documents is
indeed an indication of the CCP’s direct influence. Yet not having
these formal recognition does not mean that they do not exist. Even
according to PRC law, only state-controlled listed companies (and
other SOEs) are required to formally change their bylaws to reflect
the corporate capacities of their Party organization,264 while private
listed firms are required to set up CCP corporate capacity without
an obligation to amend their bylaws to that fact.265

Supra notes 58, 209, 211, 212.
Supra notes 79, 167, 168, and the sources therein.
264
Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5: “A state-controlled
listed company shall, according to the Company law and relevant provisions and
in consideration of its equity structure, operation, management and other reality,
include the relevant requirements for the Party building work in the bylaws.” For
other SOEs, see SOE Reform Guiding Opinion, supra note 200, art. 24.
265
See supra discussion in Part IV.B.i.1, particularly notes 202, 204, 208, 211.
262
263
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As a side note, the Act stops short of requiring a similar
disclosure about the existence of a “CCP charter” in the organizing
documents of the issuer’s affiliated Chinese operating entity.266 If
there is any benefit from such disclosure, it should have included
disclosure concerning the operating entity as well.
As this Article has shown, the CCP exerts a variety of corporate
governance capacities over Chinese firms in ways that are not
confined by conventional institutions of corporate governance and
are thus not reflected only by the indications required by the Act.
In short, the scope of the Party-state actual influence on
corporate decision making will not be made any clearer by a
disclosure to the fact that it formally exists. Investors are not
expected to gain any new insights on the financial risks of such
issuers by having such details disclosed the way they are currently
stipulated in the Act.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, from an investors’
perspective, Chinese state ownership and control, and even political
presence, do not seem to be a main source of concern. Investors are
not deterred by China’s illiberal corporate governance. Quite the
contrary, as the analysis in this Article suggests, alongside its
obstructions, illiberal corporate governance deploys mechanisms
that secure investors’ expectations and increase their confidence in
the market. Investors, and particularly sophisticated foreign
institutional investors, find assurances in the same attributes that
U.S. legislators seem averse to.
Any policy that attempts to assess the financial risks for
investors and to better safeguard their interests has to account for
the full impact of China’s illiberal corporate governance on
investors’ sentiments.
It is of course possible that the HFCA Act and particularly the
obscure disclosure requirements emanate from other considerations
that are outside the scope of investor protection.
As I detail next, indications outside the HFCA Act suggest that
these disclosure requirements indeed have little to do with concerns
for investors and more to do with the U.S. administration’s
redefining the breadth of its strategic competition with China. If the
concerns that motivate these disclosure requirements are indeed
outside the interests of investors, it is questionable whether the SEC
266
As seen supra notes 210-216, the CCP is establishing presence in an
increasingly growing number of Chinese firms and can impact U.S. issuers through
such operating entities.
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is the most appropriate body to define the boundaries of state
control and to assess the scope of potential influence by the CCP.
b. Global Investments by U.S. Investors in Chinese Firms
In a series of recent steps, the U.S. administration acted to limit
U.S. investments in Chinese firms even outside U.S. financial
markets.267
An SEC roundtable was formed to examine “the risks of
investing in emerging markets,” including China.268 In preparation,
the SEC issued a risk analysis report alerting about the level of
exposure of U.S. investors to China’s domestic capital market, 269
noting particularly the rising scope of mutual funds and state-level
public pension funds’ exposure to China through indices that track
Chinese companies A share market.270
Paralleling this, a Presidential Working Group was assembled
and tasked to examine risks to investors in U.S. financial markets
related to China-based issuers. 271 Its resulting recommendations,
however, extend beyond such mandate and address potential risks
to U.S. public investors through their exposure to Chinese issuers
outside U.S. financial markets. The Presidential Working Group’s
recommendations urged the SEC to take steps to increase investors’
awareness of the potential risks of investing in China (and in other

267
Pressuring retirement funds that manage pension accounts of government
employees to pull-back from their investments in China’s capital market. See Ana
Swanson, Federal Retirement Fund Halts Planned China Investment Under Pressure,
N. Y.
TIMES,
(May
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/business/economy/china-tsp-federalretirement-fund.html [https://perma.cc/22TG-AHLF].
268
Spotlight on Risks for Investors in Emerging Markets, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N
(modified Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/page/emerging-marketsroundtable [https://perma.cc/Z7NY-VVYV].
269
U.S. Investors’ Exposure to Domestic Chinese Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N
5-10 (July 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Investors-Exposure-toDomestic-Chinese-Issuers_2020.07.06.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJL2-D6SS].
270
Id. at 5. For explanation on the different share types see, supra note 20.
271
The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets: Report on Protecting
United States Investors from Significant Risks from Chinese Companies (July 24, 2020),
[the
Presidential
Working
Group]
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/PWG-Report-on-ProtectingUnited-States-Investors-from-Significant-Risks-from-Chinese-Companies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FGK9-6HNW].
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emerging markets, particularly in “non-cooperating jurisdictions”),
by272:
1) promoting enhanced risk disclosure by registered investment
funds that have portfolio exposure to issuers from China;
2) encouraging or requiring registered funds that track indices
to conduct more robust due diligence of index providers prior to the
selection of the index for investment; and,
3) issuing guidance to investment advisers with respect to their
fiduciary obligations when considering investments in China (or
other emerging markets).
Promoting enhanced risk disclosure and more robust due
diligence prior to making investment decisions is a balanced
approach that focuses on investors’ interests and leaves risk
assessment essentially in the hands of market participants.
A more radical move, however, was taken in November 2020
when former U.S. President Donald Trump issued an Executive
Order to curtail retail and institutional investments in certain
Chinese firms. The order was issued based on such firms posing a
“national emergency” threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, stating that “the PRC exploits
United States investors to finance the development and
modernization of its military.” 273
Following the Executive Order, effective January 11, 2021, any
transaction by a U.S. person in publicly traded securities (including
through derivatives and other transactions that provide investment
exposure to such securities) of any “Communist Chinese Military
Company” is prohibited. 274 A “Communist Chinese Military
Company” is any person (individual or entity) that is identified by
the U.S. Department of Defense to be owned or controlled by the
People’s Liberation Army, and to be engaged in providing
commercial services, manufacturing, producing, or exporting, and
the publicly listed subsidiaries of such person.275 The list comprises
forty-four entities so far. 276 The list does not only include pure
Id. at 3-4.
Exec. Order No. 13959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,815
(Nov. 12, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13959.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YVH2-BLG5].
274 Id. at Section 1(a).
275 Id. at Section 4 (“Definitions”).
276
Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, In
Accordance with Section 1237 of FY99 NDAA, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., (Jan 14, 2021),
272

273
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defense contractors but also Chinese companies that produce
bridges, supercomputers, video surveillance equipment,
agrochemicals, and more.277
Importantly, the implications of the Executive Order extend
beyond these forty-four entities due to the prevailing group and
network structures that characterize ownership and control in many
Chinese business groups.278 So far, twenty-two entities from the list
were identified to have a total of at least sixty-eight affiliates whose
securities are included on major indices. 279 The number of firms
identified as Communist Chinese Military Companies is sure to
grow also in light of China’s Military-Civil Fusion plan (Junmin
ronghe).280
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State expressed an implicit
intent to broaden the scope of forbidden (or at least discouraged)
public investment to investments in all Chinese entities that are
perceived as “malign” to U.S. national interests. 281 This includes
companies listed on the Department of Commerce Entity List and

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2472464/dodreleases-list-of-additional-companies-in-accordance-with-section-1237-of-fy/
[https://perma.cc/9NNE-FPR2].
277
For an analysis of the entities included, see Hannah Reale, Meet the Military
Affiliates,
WIRE
CHINA,
(Dec.
6,
2020),
https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/12/06/meet-the-military-affiliates/
[https://perma.cc/8RCJ-5V35].
278
See generally Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 73 (detailing the prevailing
ownership structures and network affiliates in China’s centrally controlled stateowned groups).
279
Fact Sheet, U.S. Investors Are Funding Malign PRC Companies on Major
Indices,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
(Dec.
5,
2020),
https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USSTATEBPA/2020/12/05/file_
attachments/1618345/FACT%20SHEET%20%20PRC%20Firms%20on%20Indices.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2Y2-86NZ].
280
The Military-Civil Fusion is a PRC national development plan that enlists
the private sector, particularly in advanced technology industries, to help
modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, the PRC military) through adapting
commercial technologies for military use and developing dual-use technologies.
See Zhongyang Junwei Guanyu Shenhua Guofang he Jundui Gaige de Yijian [中央
军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见] (Central Military Commission Opinions on
Deepening the Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces), XINHUA (Jan. 1,
2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm
[https://perma.cc/PQK3-ZJNW] (the roots of the Military-Civil Fusion plan were
likely laid in 2013, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Party Committee,
which emphasized modernization reform in the PLA).
281 See supra note 279.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1002

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

their affiliates, 282 in so far that they have issued publicly traded
securities.283
These blacklists have made some impact, leading several index
providers to remove, or consider removing, certain Chinese firms
from their indices284 and pressuring the NYSE into delisting certain
firms.285
In this context, the rationale behind the disclosure requirements
in the HFCA Act becomes clearer. Gaining more information about
state ownership, control, and CCP capacities in U.S. issuers and their
affiliates is likely designed to aid the difficult process of identifying
potential national threats and substantiate future expansion of the
blacklists. Yet, here as well, additional disclosures about the
operations of the issuers, their production lines, major clients,
funding sources, operating assets, etc. are potentially more
informative for the purposes of the Executive Order than a
disclosure about the Party or state formal channels of corporate
impact alone.
These recent steps by the U.S. administration are unprecedented.
They go beyond pushing non-compliant China-based issuers out of
U.S. financial markets, to demanding investors to actively divest of
Chinese firms even when they have no footing in the U.S. market.
Doing so de facto imposes extraterritorial application of U.S.

282
The Department of Commerce Entity List prohibits the export of protected
US technology to a list of legal persons without first obtaining a license from the US
government, on the grounds of their engagement in sanctioned activities or in
activities that are contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-ofconcern/entity-list [https://perma.cc/V957-SW82]. The list currently includes 260
PRC entities, including 136 companies (the rest are individuals), see Mei zai Jiang 11
Jiazhongqi Lie ru Shiti Qingdan Zhuanjia: Bei “La Hei” hou Jiben Bu Keneng “Bian Bai”
[美再将 11 家中企列入实体清单 专家：被”拉黑”后基本不可能”变白”] (U.S. Relists
11 Chinese Companies on the Entity List: Can’t Be Whitened After Being Blackened), SINA
NEWS,
Jul.
21,
2020,
https://news.sina.cn/2020-07-21/detailiivhvpwx6697428.d.html [https://perma.cc/PZP7-67AJ].
283
Currently, only thirteen of the companies on the Department of Commerce
Entity List are included or have affiliated entities that are included in the
Department of Defense list of Communist Chinese Military Companies. See Reale,
supra note 277.
284
Reale, supra note 277.
285
Alan Rappeport & Paul Mozur, New York Stock Exchange Pressured to Push
Ahead and Delist 3 Chinese Firms, N. Y. TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2021, updated Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/business/nyse-china-telecomfirms.html [https://perma.cc/KV95-4SH2].
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geopolitical considerations onto financial markets’ participants, 286
prohibiting their global investments in companies that are deemed
to have been operating in conflict with national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States, while sidestepping their
economic interest. These steps are a further illustration that the lines
between economic interests and national security interests are
colliding, reflecting that market participants cannot remain
independent from politics, even in liberal capitalist systems.
It is for policymakers to decide if the ends justify the means. Yet
we should acknowledge that the currently chosen means embody
the same market characteristics that antagonized U.S. policymakers
against China all along—the politicization and advancement of
national interests through the market at the expense of investors and
free trade. The system of global finance is reactively pushed further
and further away from market liberalism.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

In the past two decades, the world has witnessed China’s
growing integration with global financial markets. Chinese firms,
regardless of state ownership or political control, successfully attract
external finance both at home and abroad.
The allure of these firms to domestic and foreign investors is
puzzling given assumptions about the associated risks and
prevailing theories on the role of robust investor-oriented legal
institutions in securing public finance. This Article explicates this
puzzle and contributes an explanation that is grounded in the
functions of China’s illiberal corporate governance.
Alongside its many impediments, China’s illiberal governance
utilizes alternative mechanisms—at both state and Party
capacities—to ensure market regularity.
These alternative
governance mechanisms boost market stability and discipline
corporate insiders. Through both carrots and sticks, such an
alternative framework supports market growth and reassures
investors that their reasonable expectations for returns will be met.
China’s growing integration in the world economy alongside
recent policy debates in favor of “economic decoupling” makes
286
”The Chinese Communist Party’s threat to American national security
extends into our financial markets and impacts American investors.” U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, supra note 279.
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understanding these corporate governance features imperative. The
positive externalities of illiberal corporate governance must be
considered as well. The task, however, is greater than assessing
financial risks. Only by deepening our understanding of the full
functions of China’s illiberal governance with respect to firms and
the market, can a suitable policy be tailored to protect the interests
of investors and other market constituents.
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